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Abstract
We consider fault-tolerant boolean formulas in which the output of a faulty gate is short-
circuited to one of the gate’s inputs. A recent result by Kalai et al. [FOCS 2012] converts any
boolean formula into a resilient formula of polynomial size that works correctly if less than a
fraction 1/6 of the gates (on every input-to-output path) are faulty. We improve the result of
Kalai et al., and show how to efficiently fortify any boolean formula against a fraction 1/5 of
short-circuit gates per path, with only a polynomial blowup in size. We additionally show that
it is impossible to obtain formulas with higher resilience and sub-exponential growth in size.
Towards our results, we consider interactive coding schemes when noiseless feedback is
present; these produce resilient boolean formulas via a Karchmer-Wigderson relation. We de-
velop a coding scheme that resists up to a fraction 1/5 of corrupted transmissions in each
direction of the interactive channel. We further show that such a level of noise is maximal for
coding schemes with sub-exponential blowup in communication. Our coding scheme takes a
surprising inspiration from Blockchain technology.
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1 Introduction
Kleitman, Leighton and Ma [KLM97] asked the following question: assume you wish to build a logic
circuit C from AND and OR gates, however, due to some confusion, some small amount of AND
gates were placed in the box of the OR gates (and vice versa), and there is no way to distinguish
between the two types of gates just by looking at them. Can you construct a “resilient” logic circuit
C ′ that computes the same functionality of C, even if some (small amount) of the AND gates are
replaced with OR gates (and vice versa)?
The above toy question is a special case of a more general type of noise (faulty gates) known as
short-circuit noise. In this model, a faulty gate “short-circuits” one of its input-legs to the output-
leg. That is, the output of the gate is determined by the value of one of its input-legs. The specific
input that is connected to the output is determined by an all-powerful adversary, possibly as a
function of the input to the circuit. This model is equivalent to a setting in which a faulty gate can
be replaced with an arbitrary function g, as long as it holds that g(0, 0) = 0 and g(1, 1) = 1. Note
that this type of noise is different from the so-called von Neumann noise model for circuits [vN56],
in which the noise flips the value of each wire in the circuit independently with probability p.
See [KLM97, KLR12] and references therein for a comparison between these two separate models.
The first solution to the above question—constructing circuits that are resilient to short-circuit
faults—was provided by Kleitman et al. [KLM97]. They show that for any number e, a circuit of
size |C| gates can be transformed into a “resilient” circuit of size |C ′| that behaves correctly even
if up to e of its gates are faulty (short-circuited), and it holds that |C ′| ≤ O(e · |C|+ elog 3).
Further progress was made by Kalai, Lewko, and Rao [KLR12] showing, for any constant ε > 0,
how to convert any formula1 F of size |F | into a resilient formula F ′ of size |F ′| = polyε(|F |) such
that F ′ computes the same function that F computes, as long as at most (16 − ε)-fraction of the
gates in any input-to-output path in F ′ suffer from short-circuit noise. Kalai et al. explicitly leave
open the question of finding the optimal fraction of faulty gates for a resilient formula F ′.2
We make further progress on the above open question and show that 15 is a tight bound on
the tolerable fraction of faulty gates per input-to-output path, conditioned that the increase in the
size of the formula is sub-exponential. Namely, we show how to convert any formula to a resilient
version that tolerates up to a fraction 15 − ε of short-circuit gates per path,
Theorem 1.1 (Main, informal). For any ε > 0, any formula F can be efficiently converted into a
formula F ′ of size |F ′| = polyε(|F |) that computes the same function as F even when up to 15 − ε
of the gates in any of its input-to-output paths are short-circuited.
We also show that our bound is tight. Namely, for an arbitrary formula F , it is impossible
to make a resilient version (of sub-exponential size in |F |) that tolerates a fraction 15 (or more) of
short-circuit gates per path.
Theorem 1.2 (Converse). There exists a formula F for computing some function f , such that no
formula F ′ of size |F ′| = o(exp(|F |)) that computes f is resilient to a fraction 15 of short-circuit
noise in any of its input-to-output paths.
1A formula is a circuit in which each gate has fan-out 1.
2For instance, it is clear that if all the gates in an input-to-output path can be short-circuited (i.e., the fraction of
noise is 1), then the adversary has full control on the output of the circuit. Hence, the optimal noise rate for formulas
lies within the range [ 1
6
, 1].
3
Similar to the work of Kalai et al. [KLR12], a major ingredient in our result is a transformation,
known as the Karchmer-Wigderson transformation (hereinafter, the KW-transformation) [KW90],
between a formula that computes a boolean function f , and a two-party interactive communication
protocol for a task related to f which we denote the KW-game for f , or KWf for short. Similarly,
a reverse KW-transformation converts protocols back to formulas; see below and Section 6.1 for
more details on the KW-transformation. The work of Kalai et al. adapts the KW-transformation
to a noisy setting in which the formula may suffer from short-circuit noise, and the protocol may
suffer from channel noise. The “attack plan” in [KLR12] for making a given formula F resilient
to short-circuit noise is (i) apply the KW-transformation to obtain an interactive protocol π; (ii)
Convert π to a noise-resilient protocol π′ that tolerates up to δ-fraction of noise; (iii) apply the
(reverse) KW-transformation on π′ to obtain a formula F ′. The analysis of [KLR12] shows that the
obtained F ′ is resilient to δ/2 fraction of noise in any of its input-to-output paths.
The interactive protocols π, π′ are defined in a setting where the parties have access to a noiseless
feedback channel—the sender learns whether or not its transmission arrived correctly at the other
side. Building upon recent progress in the field of coding for interactive protocols (see, e.g., [Gel17]),
Kalai et al. [KLR12] construct a coding scheme for interactive protocols (with noiseless feedback)
that features resilience of δ = 13 − ε for any ε > 0; this gives their result. Note that a resilience
of δ = 1/3 is maximal for interactive protocols in that setting [EGH16], suggesting that new
techniques must be introduced in order to improve the result by [KLR12].
The loss in resilience witnessed in step (iii) stems from the fact that short-circuit noise affects
formulas in a “one-sided” manner: a short-circuit of an AND gate can only turn the output from
0 to 1. A short-circuit in an OR gate can only turn the output from 1 to 0. The noisy AND gates
are thus decoupled from the noisy OR gates: if the output of the circuit is 0, any amount of short-
circuited OR gates will keep the output 0 and if the output is 1 any amount of short-circuited AND
gates will keep the output 1; see Lemma 6.3. Informally speaking, this decoupling reduces by half
the resilience of circuits generated by the KW-transformation. Assume the formula F ′ obtained
from the above process is resilient to δ′-fraction of noise. Then F ′ is correct if on a specific input-
to-output path (a) at most δ′-fraction of the AND gates are short-circuited, but also if (b) at most
δ′-fraction of the OR gates are short-circuited. Since the noise is decoupled, from (a) and (b) we
get that F outputs the correct value even when 2δ′-fraction of the gates on that input-to-output
path are noisy. Yet, the resilience of F ′ originates in the resilience of π′ (step (iii) above). The KW-
transformation limits the resilience of F ′ by the resilience of π′, i.e., 2δ′ ≤ δ, leading to a factor 2 loss.
We revisit the above line of thought and take a more careful noise analysis. Instead of bounding
the total fraction of noise by some δ, we consider the case where the noise from Alice to Bob is
bounded by some α while the noise in the other direction is bounded by β. A similar approach used
by Braverman and Efremenko [BE17], yields interactive protocols (without noiseless feedback) with
maximal resilience. In more detail, assume that the protocol π communicates n symbols overall.
We define an (α, β)-corruption as any noise that corrupts up to αn symbols sent by Alice and up
to βn symbols sent by Bob. We emphasize that the noise fraction on Alice transmissions is higher
than α, since Alice speaks less than n symbols overall; the global noise fraction in this case is α+β.
This distinction may be delicate but is instrumental. The KW-transformation translates a
protocol of length n that is resilient to (α, β)-corruptions into a formula which is resilient to up
to αn short-circuited AND gates in addition to up to βn short-circuited OR gates. When α = β
the obtained formula is resilient to up to α-fraction of short-circuited gates in any input-to-output
path, avoiding the factor 2 loss in resilience.
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1.1 Techniques overview
Achievability: Coding schemes for noisy channels with noiseless feedback. We obtain
resilient formulas by employing the approach of [KLR12] described above. In order to increase
the noise resilience to its optimal level, we develop a novel coding scheme which is resilient to
(1/5 − ε, 1/5 − ε)-corruptions, assuming noiseless feedback.
The mechanism of our coding scheme resembles, in a sense, the Blockchain technology [Nak08].
Given a protocol π0 that assumes reliable channels, the parties simulate π0 message by message.
These messages may arrive at the other side correctly or not, however, a noiseless feedback channel
allows each party to learn which of its messages made it through. With this knowledge, the party
tries to create a “chain” of correct messages. Each message contains a pointer to the last message
that was not corrupted by the channel. As time goes by, the chain grows and grows, and indicates
the entire correct communication of that party. An appealing feature of this mechanism is the
fact that whenever a transmission arrives correctly at the other side, the receiver learns all the
correct transmissions so far. On the other hand, the receiver never knows whether a single received
transmission (and the chain linked to it) is indeed correct.
The adversarial noise may corrupt up to (1/5−ε)n of the messages sent by each party. We think
of the adversary as trying to construct a different, corrupt, chain. Due to its limited budget, at the
end of the coding scheme one of two things may happen. Either it is the case that the correct chain
is the longest, or it is the case where the longest chain contains in its prefix a sufficient amount of
uncorrupted transmissions.
Indeed, if the adversary tries to create its own chain, its length is bounded by (1/5− ε)n, while
the correct chain is at least of length 2n/5.3 On the other hand, the adversary can create a longer
chain which forks off the correct chain. As a simple example, consider the case where a party
sends ≈ 2n/5 messages which go through uncorrupted. Now the adversary starts corrupting the
transmissions and extends the correct chain with (1/5−ε)n corrupt messages.4 The corrupt forked
chain is of length 2n/5 + (1/5 − ε)n and may be longer than the correct chain. However, in this
case, the information contained in the uncorrupted prefix of the corrupt forked chain is sufficient
to simulate the entire transcript of π0.
Another essential part of our coding scheme is its ability to alter the order of speaking according
to the observed noise.5 Most previous work usually follows the succeeding intuition. If party’s
transmissions were corrupted, then the information contained in these transmissions still needs to
reach the other side. Therefore, the coding scheme should allow that party to speak more times.
In this work we take the opposite direction—the more a party is corrupted at the first part of the
protocol, the less it speaks in the later part. The intuition here is that if the adversary has already
wasted its budget on the party, it cannot corrupt much of the sequential transmissions and we can
reduce their amount. A resembling approach appears in [AGS16].
3The order of speaking in the coding scheme depends on the noise and is not alternating. Therefore, it is not
necessary that a party speak half of the times. See discussion below.
4This attack assumes that there are n/5 additional rounds where the same party speak. This assumption is usually
false and serves only for this intuitive (yet unrealistic) example.
5Protocols that change their length or order of speaking as a function of the observed noise are called adap-
tive [GHS14, AGS16]. Since these decisions are noise-dependent, the parties may disagree on the identity of the
speaker in each round, e.g., both parties may decide to speak in a given round, etc. We emphasize that due to the
noiseless feedback there is always a consensus regarding whose turn it is to speak next. Hence, while our scheme has
a non-predetermined order of speaking, the scheme is non-adaptive by the terminology of [EGH16]; see discussion
in [EGH16] and in Section 6 of [Gel17].
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One hurdle we face in constructing our coding scheme comes from the need to communicate
pointers to previous messages using a small (constant-size) alphabet. Towards this end, we first
show a coding scheme that works with a large alphabet that is capable of pointing back to any
previous transmission. Next, we employ a variable-length coding, replacing each pointer with a
large number of messages over a constant-size alphabet. We prove that this coding does not harm
the resilience, leading to a coding scheme with a constant-size alphabet and optimal resilience to
(1/5 − ε, 1/5 − ε)-corruptions.
Converse: Impossibility Bound. The converse proof consists of two parts. First, we show
that for certain functions, any protocol resilient to (1/5, 1/5)-corruptions must have an exponential
blowup in the communication. In the second part, we show a (noisy) KW-transformation from
formulas to protocols. Together, we obtain an upper bound on the noise of formulas. Indeed,
assuming that there is a “shallow” formula that is resilient to (1/5, 1/5)-corruptions, converting it
into a protocol yields a “short” protocol with resilience to (1/5, 1/5)-corruptions. The existence of
such a protocol contradicts the bound of the first part.
The bound on the resilience of protocols follows a natural technique of confusing a party between
two possible inputs. We demonstrate that a (1/5, 1/5)-corruption suffices in making one party (say,
Alice) observe exactly the same transcript whether Bob holds y or y′. Choosing x, y, y′ such that
the output of the protocol differs between (x, y) and (x, y′), leads to Alice erring on at least one of
the two instances.
This idea does not work if the protocol is allowed to communicate a lot of information. To
illustrate this point, assume f : Σn × Σn → Σz defined over a channel with alphabet Σ. Consider
a protocol where the parties send their inputs to the other side encoded via a standard Shannon
error-correcting code of length n′ = O(n) symbols, with distance 1−ε for some small constant ε > 0.
The protocol communicates 2n′ symbols overall, and a valid (1/5, 1/5)-corruption may corrupt up
to 2n′/5 symbols of each one of the codewords. However, this does not suffice to invalidate the
decoding of either of the codewords, since an error correcting code with distance ≈1 is capable of
correcting up to ≈n′/2 corrupted symbols.
On the other hand, once we limit the communication of the protocol, even moderately, to
around n symbols, the above encoding is not applicable anymore. Quite informally, our lower
bound follows the intuition described below. We show the existence of a function f such that for
any protocol that computes f in r rounds (where r is restricted as mentioned above), the following
properties hold for one of the parties (stated below, without loss of generality, for Alice). There are
inputs x, x′, y, y′ such that (1) f(x, y) 6= f(x′, y) 6= f(x′, y′) and (2) Alice speaks at most r/5 times
during the first 2r/5 rounds. Further, (3) when Alice holds x, the protocol communicates exactly
the same messages during its first 2r/5 rounds, whether Bob holds y or y′ (assuming no channel
noise is present).
When we bound the protocol to these conditions, a (1/5, 1/5)-corruption is strong enough to
make the transcript identical from Alice’s point of view on (x′, y) and (x′, y′), implying the protocol
cannot be resilient to such an attack. In more details, we now describe an attack and assume Bob
speaks at most 2r/5 times beyond round number 2r/5, given the attack. [If Bob speaks more, then
an equivalent attack will be able to confuse Bob rather than Alice.] The attack changes the first
2r/5 rounds as if Alice holds x rather than x′; this amounts to corrupting at most r/5 transmissions
by Alice due to property (2). Bob behaves the same regardless of its input due to property (3).
From round 2r/5 and beyond, the attack corrupts Bob’s messages so that the next r/5 symbols
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Bob sends are consistent with y and the following r/5 symbols Bob communicates are consistent
with y′. Since Bob speaks less than 2r/5 times (given the above noise), the attack corrupts at most
r/5 of Bob’s transmissions after round 2r/5.
Unfortunately, while the above shows that some functions f cannot be computed in a resilient
manner, this argument cannot be applied towards a lower bound on resilient formulas. The reason
is the KWf task is not a function, but rather a relation—multiple outputs may be valid for a
single input. The attack on protocols described earlier shows that a (1/5, 1/5)-corruption drives
the protocol to produce a different output than in the noiseless instance. However, it is possible
that a resilient protocol gives a different but correct output.
Therefore, we need to extend the above argument so it applies to computations of arbitrary
relations. Specifically, we consider the parity function on n bits and its related KW-game. We show
the existence of inputs that satisfy conditions (2) and (3) above while requiring that the outputs
of different inputs be disjoint. I.e., any possible output of (x′, y) is invalid for (x, y) and for (x′, y′).
The last part of the converse proof requires developing a KW-transformation from formulas
to protocols, in a noise-resilience preserving manner. Let us begin with some background on the
(standard) KW-transformation (see Section 6.1 for a formal description). The KW game (or rather
a slight adaptation we need for our purposes) is as follows. For a boolean function f on {0, 1}n,
Alice gets an input x such that f(x) = 0 and Bob gets an input y such that f(y) = 1, their goal is
to output a literal function ℓ(z) (i.e. one of the 2n functions of the form ℓ(z) = zi or ℓ(z) = ¬zi)
such that ℓ(x) = 0 and ℓ(y) = 1.
Let F be a boolean formula for f , consisting of ∨ and ∧ gates, and where all the negations are
pushed to the input layer (i.e. F is a monotone formula of the literals zi, ¬zi). The conversion of
F to a protocol π for the KWf game is as follows. View the formula as the protocol tree, with the
literals at the bottom of the tree being the output literal function. Assign each ∧ node to Alice,
and each ∨ node to Bob.
The invariant maintained throughout the execution of the protocol is that if the protocol reaches
a node v, then the value of v in F is 0 when evaluated on x, and 1 when evaluated on y. Each
time when the protocol is at node v and it is Alice’s turn to speak (thus v is an ∧ gate in F ), Alice
sends the identity of a child which evaluates to 0 on x. Note that assuming the invariant holds
for v, Alice can send the identity of such a child (since one of the inputs to an AND gate which
outputs a 0 also evaluates to 0), while this child must evaluate to 1 on y assuming v evaluates to 1
on y. By maintaining this invariant, Alice and Bob arrive at the bottom, where they reach a literal
evaluating to 0 on x and 1 on y. Note that there is some room for arbitrary decision making: if
more than one child of v evaluates to 0 on x, Alice is free to choose any such child—the protocol
will be valid for any such choice.
In this work we extend the above standard KW-transformation to the noisy-regime. Namely, we
wish to convert a resilient formula into an interactive protocol π while keeping the protocol resilient
to a similar level of channel noise. We note that the extension we need is completely different from
previous uses of the KW-transformation. Indeed, for the achievability bound, a KW-transformation
is used both in steps (i) and (iii) in the above outline of [KLR12]. However, the instance used in
step (i) assumes there is no noise, while the instance in step (iii) works in the other direction, i.e.,
it transforms (resilient) protocols to (resilient) formulas.
Similar to the standard transformation, our noisy KW-transformation starts by constructing
a protocol tree based on the formula’s structure, where every ∧-gate is assigned to Alice and any
∨-gate to Bob. The main difference is in the decision making of how to proceeds when reaching a
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node v. The goal is to keep the invariant that the gate v in F evaluates to 0 on x and to 1 on y,
even when noise is present.
When only one of v’s descendants evaluates to 0 on x in F , Alice has no choice but to choose
that child. However, when more than a single descendant evaluate to 0 on x, Alice’s decision is less
obvious. Moreover, this decision may affect the resilience of the protocol—it is possible that noise
causes one of the descendants evaluate to 1 on that given x.
We observe, however, that one of v’s children evaluates to 0 on x given all the noise patterns F is
resilient against. The other children may still evaluate to 1 sometimes, as a function of the specific
noise. Once we identify this special child that always evaluates to 0, Alice can safely choose it and
maintain the invariant (and the correctness of the protocol), regardless of future noise. Giving some
more details, we prove that if such a special child did not exist and all descendants could evaluate
to both 0 and 1 as a function of the noise, then we could construct a noise E∗ that would make all
descendants evaluate to 1 on x simultanously. Hence, assuming the noise is E∗, the node v would
evaluate to 1 on x, and consequently F (x) = 1. At the same time, we show that F is resilient to
the noise E∗, so F (x) = 0 assuming the noise is E∗, and we reach a contradiction.
1.2 Other related work
The field of interactive coding schemes [Gel17] started with the seminal line of work by Schul-
man [Sch92, RS94, Sch96]. Commonly, the goal is to compile interactive protocols into a noise-
resilient version that has (1) good noise resilience; (2) good rate; and (3) good probability of
success. Computational efficiency is another desired goal. Numerous works achieve these goals,
either fully or partially [BR14, GMS14, BKN14, FGOS15, BE17, GH14, KR13, Hae14, GHK+16],
where the exact parameters depend on the communication and noise model.
Most related to this work are coding schemes in the setting where a noiseless feedback channel is
present. Pankratov [Pan13] gave the first interactive coding scheme that assumes noiseless feedback.
The scheme of [Pan13] aims to maximize the rate of the scheme assuming all communication passes
over a binary symmetric channel (BSC) with flipping parameter ε (i.e., a channel that communicates
bits, where every bit is flipped with probability ε, independently of other bits). Pankratov’s scheme
achieves a rate of 1 − O(√ε) when ε → 0. Gelles and Haeupler [GH17] improved the rate in that
setting to 1 − O(ε log 1/ε), which is the current state of the art. For the regime of large noise,
Efremenko, Gelles, and Haeupler [EGH16] provided coding schemes with maximal noise resilience,
assuming noiseless feedback. They showed that the maximal resilience depends on the channel’s
alphabet size and on whether or not the order of speaking is noise-dependent. Specifically, they
developed coding schemes with a noise-independent order of speaking and a constant rate that are
resilient to 1/4 − ε and 1/6 − ε fraction of noise with a ternary and binary alphabet, respectively.
When the order of speaking may depend on the noise, the resilience increases to 1/3 − ε for any
alphabet size. They show that these noise levels are optimal and that no general coding scheme
can resist higher levels of noise.
There has been tremendous work on coding for noisy channels with noiseless feedback in the
one-way (non-interactive) communication setting, starting with the work of Shannon, Horstein,
and Berlekamp [Sha56, Hor63, Ber64]. It is known that the presence of feedback does not change
the channel’s capacity, however, it improves the error exponent. The maximal noise-resilience
in this setting is also known. Recently, Haeupler, Kamath, and Velingker [HKV15] considered
deterministic and randomized codes that assume a partial presence of feedback.
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1.3 Organization
The first half of our paper considers interactive coding protocols over noisy channels with noise-
less feedback. Section 3 proves that any interactive coding scheme that is resilient to (1/5, 1/5)-
corruptions must exhibit a zero rate. Sections 4–5 describe our constant-rate coding scheme that is
resilient to (1/5− ε, 1/5− ε)-corruptions. First, Section 4 describes a scheme with a large alphabet
(polynomial in the length of the protocol). Then, Section 5 shows how to reduce the alphabet to a
constant size.
The second half of the paper (Section 6) considers noise-resilient circuits. First, in Section 6.1
we recall the notions of formulas, short-circuit noise and the (noiseless) KW-transformation. In
Section 6.2 we present our noise-preserving KW-transformation and show how to convert a resilient
formula into a resilient protocol. This reduction (along with the impossibility of Section 3) proves
the converse theorem, showing that the resilience we obtain for formulas is maximal. In Section 6.3
we provide the other direction, a noise-resilient transformation from protocols to formulas (follow-
ing [KLR12]). Employing the coding scheme of Section 5 we give an efficient method that compiles
any formula into an optimal resilient version.
2 Preliminaries
Notations For integers i ≤ j we denote by [i, j] the set {i, i+1, . . . , j} any by [i] the set {1, . . . , i}.
For a string s ∈ Σ∗ and two indices x, y ∈ {1, . . . , |s|}, x < y we let s[x, y] = sxsx+1 · · · sy. We will
treat ∅ as the empty word, i.e., for any a ∈ Σ∗ we have a ◦ ∅ = ∅ ◦ a = a. For bits a, b ∈ {0, 1}
we let a⊕ b = a + b mod 2, and b = 1 − b. All logarithms are taken to base 2, unless the base is
explicitly written.
Interactive Protocols In the interactive setting we have two parties, Alice and Bob, which
receive private inputs x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , respectively. Their goal is to compute some predefined
function f(x, y) : X × Y → Z by sending messages to each other. A Protocol describes for
each party the next message to send, given its input and the communication received so far. We
assume the parties send symbols from a fixed alphabet Σ. The protocol also determines when the
communication ends and the output value (as a function of the input and received communication).
Formally, an interactive protocol π can be seen as a |Σ|-ary tree (also referred to as the protocol
tree), where each node v is assigned either to Alice or to Bob. For any v node assigned to Alice
there exists a mapping av : X → Σ that maps the next symbol Alice should send, given her input.
Similarly, for each one of Bob’s nodes we set a mapping bv : Y → Σ. Each leaf is labeled with
an element of Z. The output of the protocol on input (x, y) is the element at the leaf reached by
starting at the root node, and traversing down the tree where at each internal node v owned by
Alice (resp., Bob), if av(x) = i (resp., bv(y) = i) the protocol advances to the i-th child of v. We
conveniently denote Alice’s nodes by the set Va and Bob’s nodes by the set Vb. We may assume
that all the nodes in a given protocol tree are reachable by some input (x, y) ∈ X × Y (otherwise,
we can prune that branch without affecting the behaviour of the protocol). Note that the order
of speaking in π is not necessarily alternating and it is possible the same party is the sender in
consecutive rounds. For any given transcript T , we denote π(· | T ) the instance of π assuming the
history T . Specifically, assuming Alice is the sender in the next round (assuming the history so far
is T ), then the next communicated symbol is π(x | T ).
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The length of a protocol, denoted |π|, is the length of the longest root-to-leaf path in the
protocol tree, or equivalently, it is the maximal number of symbols the protocol communicates in
any possible instantiation. In the following we assume that all instances have the same length |π|.
The communication complexity of the protocol is
CC(π) = |π| log |Σ| = |π| · O(1) = O(|π|).
Transmission Noise with Feedback We will assume the communication channel may be noisy,
that is, the received symbol may mismatch with the sent symbol. All the protocols considered in
this work assume the setting of noiseless feedback : the sender always learns the symbol that the
other side received (whether corrupted or not). The receiver, however, does not know whether the
symbol it received is indeed the one sent to him.
A noise pattern is defined as E ∈ {0, 1, . . . , |Σ| − 1, ∗}|Va|∪|Vb|. For any node v, Ev denotes the
symbol that the receiver gets for the transmission that is done when the protocol reaches the node v.
Specifically, say v is an Alice-owned node, then if Ev = ∗, Bob receives the symbol sent by Alice;
otherwise, Ev 6= ∗, Bob receives the symbol Ev. Note that due to the feedback, Alice learns that
her transmission was corrupted as well as the symbol that Bob received, and the protocol descends
to the node dictated by Ev. We denote by πE the protocol π when the noise is dictated by E;
we sometimes write π0 for a run of the protocol with no transmission noise, i.e., with the pattern
E = ∗|Va|∪|Vb|.
We say that a protocol is resilient to a noise pattern E if for any (x, y) ∈ X × Y it holds that
πE outputs the same value as π0. While it is common to limit the noise to a constant fraction of
the transmissions, in this work we take a more careful look at the noise, and consider the exact
way it affects the transmissions of each party.
Definition 2.1. An (α, β)-corruption, is a noise pattern that changes at most α|π| symbols sent
by Alice and at most β|π| symbols sent by Bob. Note that the effective (combined) noise rate is
(α+ β).
3 Resilience to (1/5, 1/5)-Corruptions is Impossible
In this section we prove that no coding scheme with constant overhead can be resilient to a (1/5, 1/5)-
corruption. To this end we show a specific (1/5, 1/5)-corruption that confuses any protocol for a
specific function f that is “hard” to compute in linear communication. Our result do not apply to
coding schemes with vanishing rate. In fact, if the communication is exponentially large, coding
schemes with resilience higher than 1/5 exist.6
Normally, we discuss the case where protocols compute a function f : X × Y → Z. While our
converse bound on the resilience of interactive protocols works for some hard function (e.g., the
pointer jumping), such a proof does not suffice towards our converse on the resilience of boolean
circuits (Theorem 1.2). The reason is that the conversion between formulas to protocols does not
yield a protocol that computes a function but rather a protocol that computes a relation. Recall
that for any given function f and any input (x, y) such that f(x) = 0 and f(y) = 1, the KW-game
6For instance, consider the scheme in which each party sends its input to the other side encoded via a standard
(Shannon) error-correcting code with distance ≈ 1. This trivial protocol is resilient to (1/4 − ε, 1/4 − ε)-corruption,
yet its rate is 0.
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for f , KWf , outputs an index i ∈ [n] for which xi 6= yi (see Section 6.1 for a formal definition).
However, multiple such indices may exist and each such index is a valid output.
Let X,Y,Z be finite set and R ⊆ X × Y ×Z be a ternary relation. For any (x, y) ∈ X × Y and
a given relation R let R(x, y) = {z | (x, y, z) ∈ R} be the set of all z that satisfy the relation for
x, y. Given such a relation, a protocol that computes the relation is the following two-party task.
Alice is given x ∈ X and Bob is given y ∈ Y . The parties need to agree on some z ∈ R(x, y). We
say that (x, y) is a valid input for R, if x ∈ X and y ∈ Y . We assume that for any valid input,
|R(x, y)| > 0.
We now show an explicit relation for which no protocol (of “short”’ length) is resilient to
(1/5, 1/5) corruptions. Specifically, in the rest of this section we consider the binary parity function
on n bits, par : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, defined for any x ∈ {0, 1}n by
par(x) = x1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xn.
Let X = {x ∈ {0, 1}n | par(x) = 0} and Y = {y ∈ {0, 1}n | par(y) = 1}. We let KWpar ⊆
X × Y × [n] be the KW-game for the parity function, defined by
KWpar = {(x, y, z) | par(x) = 0 ∧ par(y) = 1 ∧ xz 6= yz} .
Lemma 3.1. Let π be an interactive protocol of length |π| = r defined over a communication
channel with alphabet Σ and noiseless feedback. Additionally, assume n ≥ r log |Σ| + 1. If π
computes KWpar then the following holds.
There exist inputs x, x′ ∈ X, y, y′ ∈ Y for which:
(1) π(x, y) and π(x, y′) agree on the first 2r/5 rounds.
(2) During the first 2r/5 rounds of the execution π(x, y) Alice speaks fewer times than Bob.
(3) KWpar(x
′, y) ∩KWpar(x′, y′) = ∅ and KWpar(x′, y) ∩KWpar(x, y) = ∅.
Proof. Assume, without loss of generality, that Alice is the party that speaks fewer times in the
first 2r/5 rounds of π when averaging on all possible inputs (x, y) ∈ X×Y ; otherwise, a symmetric
lemma holds for Bob. Let x be an input for Alice such that on most y’s Alice speaks fewer times
in the first 2n/5 rounds of π(x, y). Such an input must exist by our choice of Alice. Let
Y ′ = {y ∈ Y | CC≤2r/5A (π(x, y)) ≤ CC≤2r/5B (π(x, y))}
Be the set of all inputs for Bob, where Alice speaks fewer times in the first 2r/5 rounds of π
assuming Alice holds the above x. By the choice of x, it holds that |Y ′| ≥ 2n/2.
Consider the set of transcript prefixes of length 2r/5 generated by π when Alice holds the above
x and Bob holds some input from the set Y ′,
Tx = {t[1, 2r/5] | t = π(x, y), y ∈ Y ′}.
Note that there are at most (2|Σ|)2r/5 different prefixes of length 2r/5 over Σ with an arbitrary
order of speaking. Since
|Y ′| ≥ 2n−1 ≥ 2r log |Σ| > 22r(1+log |Σ|)/5 ≥ |Tx|,
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by the pigeon-hole principle, there must be y, y′ ∈ Y ′ such that π(x, y) and π(x, y′) agree on the
first 2r/5 rounds of the protocol—they have an identical order of speaking and they communicate
the same information. Note that Properties (1) and (2) of the lemma are satisfied by the above
x, y, y′. We are left to show an input x′ for Alice that satisfies property (3).
Based on the above x, y, y′ we construct x′ in the following manner. For any i ∈ [n] set
x′i =
{
yi yi = y
′
i
xi yi 6= y′i
.
The above x′ is constructed such that outputs given by KWpar are disjoint if we change only the
input of Alice or only the input of Bob. Formally,
Claim 3.2. The following claims hold for the above x, x′, y, y′
(a) par(x′) = 0
(b) KWpar(x
′, y) ∩KWpar(x′, y′) = ∅
(c) KWpar(x
′, y) ∩KWpar(x, y) = ∅ and KWpar(x′, y′) ∩KWpar(x, y′) = ∅
Proof. (a) Since par(y) = par(y′) = 1 then y, y′ differ in an even number of indices (by considering
y ⊕ y′ = 0). This means that x′ = x ⊕ z where the number of ones in z is even, thus,
par(x′) = par(x)⊕ par(z) = 0.
(b) Assume towards contradiction that i ∈ KWpar(x′, y) ∩KWpar(x′, y′), i.e., x′i 6= yi as well as
x′i 6= y′i. However, x′i, yi, y′i are all bits and these two inequalities imply yi = y′i. But then,
x′i = yi by the way we construct x
′, which is a contradiction.
(c) Assume towards contradiction that i ∈ KWpar(x′, y) ∩ KWpar(x, y). That is, x′i 6= yi and
xi 6= yi which means that x′i = xi. On the other hand, by the construction of x′, either x′i 6= xi
or x′i = yi. Both options lead to a contradiction. The proof of the second part is identical.
The first claim proves that x′ is a valid input, i.e., x′ ∈ X. The other claims prove property (3)
of the lemma and conclude its proof.
Our main result in this section is the following Theorem, proving that no protocol for theKWpar
can be resilient to a (1/5, 1/5)-corruption if its communication is bounded. This will imply that
any coding scheme that is resilient to (1/5, 1/5)-corruption must have rate 0. Specifically, it cannot
produce a protocol with a constant overhead with respect to the optimal protocol that computes
KWpar over reliable channels.
Theorem 3.3. Any interactive protocol π that computes the relation KWpar by at most |π| <
(n− 1)/ log |Σ| rounds over a noisy channel with alphabet Σ and noiseless feedback, is not resilient
to (1/5, 1/5)-corruptions.
Proof. Let π be a protocol with r < (n − 1)/ log |Σ| rounds communicating symbols from the
alphabet Σ. Via Lemma 3.1, let x0, x1 ∈ X and y0, y1 ∈ Y be inputs that satisfy
(1) π(x0, y0) and π(x0, y1) agree on the first 2r/5 rounds
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(2) During the first 2r/5 bits of the protocol π(x0, y0) Alice speaks less than Bob.
(3) KWpar(x1, y0) ∩KWpar(x1, y1) = ∅ and KWpar(x1, y0) ∩KWpar(x0, y0) = ∅
We now generate a simulated transcript T and show that T is consistent with a (1/5, 1/5)-
corruption of π(x1, y0). Additionally, it is either the case that T is consistent with a (1/5, 1/5)-
corruption of π(x1, y1) or it is consistent with a (1/5, 1/5)-corruption of π(x0, y0). In the first case,
Alice is unable to distinguish the case where Bob holds y0 and y1; in the second, Bob cannot tell
if Alice holds x0 or x1. The outputs for different inputs are distinct by property (3). Thus the
confused party is bound to err on at least one of them.
Note that the simulated transcript T contains messages received by the two parties, which may
be noisy. Due to the feedback, both parties learn T . Additionally, the order of speaking in π is
entirely determined by (prefixes of) T . Specifically, if two different instances of π have the same
received transcript by round j, the party to speak in round j + 1 is identical in both instances.
The string T is obtained in the following manner:
1. Run π(x0, y0) for 2r/5 rounds. Let T1 be the generated transcript.
2. Run π(x1, y0 | T1) until Bob transmits r/5 additional symbols (unless π terminates beforehand). Let
T2 be the generated transcript.
3. (if |T1T2| < r) Run π(x1, y1 | T1T2) until Bob transmits r/5 additional symbols (unless π terminates
beforehand).
4. (if |T1T2T3| < r), let T4 describe π(x1, y0 | T1T2T3) until it terminates.
5. Set T = T1T2T3T4.
In case the above algorithm didn’t execute Step i, for i ∈ {3, 4}, assume Ti = ∅.
We now show that T corresponds to a (1/5, 1/5)-corrupted execution of π for two different valid
inputs with disjoint outputs. We consider two cases: (i) when Step 3 halts since T reached its
maximal size of r symbols (i.e., when T4 = ∅), and (ii) when Step 3 halts since Bob transmitted
r/5 symbols in this step (T4 6= ∅).
case (i) T4 = ∅. In this case we show that a (1/5, 1/5)-corruption suffices to make the executions
of π(x1, y0) and π(x1, y1) look the same from Alice’s point of view.
Let Π be the transcript of a noisy execution of π(x1, y0) (defined shortly) and split Π into
three parts Π = Π1Π2Π3 that correspond in length to T1, T2, T3. The noise changes all Alice
transmissions in Π1 so that they correspond to Alice’s symbols in T1; the noise changes all
Bob’s transmissions in Π3 so that they correspond to Bob’s transmissions in T3. It is easy
to verify that the obtained transcript Π of received messages is exactly T . Furthermore, the
first part changes at most r/5 transmissions by Alice, since by property (2) Alice speaks
fewer times in the first 2r/5 of the instance π(x0, y0). The second part changes at most r/5
transmissions of Bob since T3 halts before Bob communicates additional r/5 transmissions.
Hence the noise described above is a valid (1/5, 1/5)-corruption.
On the other hand, and abusing notations, consider a (noisy) instance of π(x1, y1) and let
Π = Π1Π2Π3 be the received messages transcript split to parts that corresponds in length
to T1, T2, T3, assuming the following noise. Again, the noise changes all Alice’s transmissions
in Π1 to be the corresponding symbols received in T1. This makes the 2r/5 first rounds of
the received transcript look as an instance π(x0, y1). By Property (1), these transmissions
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agree with the first 2r/5 transmissions in the noiseless instance π(x0, y0); hence, the corrupted
Π1 equals T1. Next, the noise changes Bob’s transmissions in Π2 to correspond to T2. The
obtained transcript Π is then exactly T . Again, T1 contains at most 2r/5 of Alice’s transmis-
sions, and T2 contains at most r/5 transmissions of Bob by their definition. Hence, this is a
valid (1/5, 1/5)-corruption.
We conclude by recalling that KWpar(x1, y0)∩KWpar(x1, y1) = ∅, then Alice must be wrong
on at least one of the above executions, since her view in both executions is the same. Note
that above proof holds even when T3 = ∅.
case (ii) T4 6= ∅. In this case we show a (1/5, 1/5)-corruptions that makes the executions of
π(x0, y0) and π(x1, y0) look the same from Bob’s point of view. We point out that Alice
speaks at most r/5 times after Step 1. Indeed, Step 1 contains 2r/5 rounds, and Steps 2–3
contain 2r/5 rounds where Bob speaks, hence Alice may speak in at most another r/5 times
after Step 1.
Let Π be the transcript of a noisy execution of π(x0, y0) where the noise is defined below.
Split Π into 4 parts Π = Π1Π2Π3Π4 that correspond in length to T1, T2, T3, T4. The noise
changes all Alice’s transmissions in Π2Π3Π4 so that they match the corresponding symbols of
T2, T3, T4. As mentioned, this corrupts at most r/5 symbols. Additionally, the noise changes
Bob’s transmissions in Π3 to correspond to T3; this by definition entails r/5 corruptions of
Bob’s transmissions. The obtained transcript Π is exactly T .
On the other hand, and abusing notations again, consider a noisy execution of π(x1, y0)
denoted by Π = Π1Π2Π3Π4. Here the noise is defined as follows. The noise changes all
Alice’s transmissions in Π1 to match the corresponding symbols of T1. As before, the noise
changes Bob’s transmissions in Π3 to match T3. Now it holds that Π = T , while the noise
corrupted at most r/5 of each party’s transmissions.
We conclude by recalling that KWpar(x0, y0)∩KWpar(x1, y0) = ∅. Thus, Bob must be wrong
on at least one of the above executions, since his view in both executions is exactly the same.
Note that KWpar has a protocol of length O(log n) assuming reliable channels.
7 Theorem 3.3
leads to the following conclusion.
Corollary 3.4. There exists an interactive protocol π0 defined over a noiseless channel with feed-
back such that any protocol π that computes the same functionality as π0 and is resilient to (1/5, 1/5)-
corruptions (assuming noiseless feedback) must incur with an exponential blowup in the communi-
cation.
As a consequence, any coding scheme that compiles any protocol into a (1/5, 1/5)-resilient
version, must have rate zero.
7This can easily be seen, e.g., by considering a formula that computes the parity of n bits, and applying the
Karchmer-Wigderson transformation [KW90].
14
4 A Coding Scheme with Large Alphabet
In this section we construct a coding scheme for interactive protocols assuming a noiseless feedback.
We show that for any constant ε > 0, any protocol π0 defined over noiseless channels (with noiseless
feedback) can be simulated by a protocol π = πε defined over noisy channels (with noiseless feed-
back) such that (1) CC(π)/CC(π0) = Oε(1), and (2) π is resilient to (1/5− ε, 1/5− ε)-corruptions.
The protocol π in this section communicates symbols from a large alphabet of polynomial size in π0.
In later sections we show how to reduce the size of the alphabet.
4.1 The coding scheme
On a high level, the coding scheme simulates π0 step by step. The availability of a noiseless feedback
channel allows a party to notice when the channel alters a transmission sent by that party. The next
time that party speaks, it will re-transmit its message and “link” the new transmission to its latest
uncorrupted transmission. That is, each message carries a “link”—a pointer to a previous message
sent by the same party. By following the links, the receiver learns the “chain” of uncorrupted
transmissions; the party considers all “off-chain” transmissions as corrupted.
The Parse procedure (in Algorithm 1) parses all the transmissions received so far and outputs
the “current chain”: the (rounds of the) transmissions linked by the latest received transmission.
Note that once a new transmission arrives, the current chain possibly changes. Moreover, upon
reception of a corrupt transmission, a corrupt chain may be retrieved.
The TempTranscript procedure determines the partial simulated transcript of π0 according
to messages received in π so far, i.e., according to the current chains. Again, the scheme considers
only transmissions that are on-chain and ignore all off-chain transmissions. The partial simulated
transcript is defined as the concatenation of all the messages that (a) were received uncorrupted
and (b) that were generated according to the correct information.
To clarify this issue, consider round i where, without loss of generality, Alice sends the message
mi. The latter property means that the last transmission received by Alice prior to round i, Prev(i)
(see Definition 4.1), must be uncorrupted. This ensures that this ensures that Alice learns which
transmissions (so far) are correct and which are not, in both directions (Lemma 4.3). It follows that
Alice has full information about the on-going simulation of π0. In particular, she can generate the
correct mi that extends the simulation of π0 by one symbol. The former property ensures that mi
itself, the correct extension of the simulation of π0, indeed arrives uncorrupted at the other side.
In each round of the protocol, the parties construct the partial transcript implied by messages
received so far. If the received transmission is uncorrupt, theTempTranscript procedure retrieves
the correct implied transcript (i.e., the implied transcript is indeed a prefix of the transcript of π0).
Then, the parties simulate the next rounds of π0 assuming the implied partial transcript. As long
as there is no noise in two alternating rounds, the next transmission extends the simulation of π0 by
one symbol. Otherwise, the sent symbol may be wrong, however, it will be ignored in future rounds
once the chains indicate that this transmission was generated due to false information. Finally,
at the end of the protocol, the parties output the transcript implied by the longest chain. The
main part of this section is proving that the longest chain indeed implies a complete and correct
simulation of π0.
An important property of the coding scheme is its adaptive order of speaking. The first 2n/5
rounds are alternating. On later rounds the order of speaking is determined according to observed
noise: the more corrupted transmissions a party has, the less the party gets to speak. In particular,
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the protocol is split into epochs of 2 or 3 rounds each. In the first two rounds of an epoch, the
order is fixed: Alice speaks in the first round and Bob speaks in the second. Then, the parties
estimate the noise each party suffered so far (namely, the length of their current chain) and decide
whether or not the epoch has a third round as well as who gets to speak in that extra round. For
Alice to be the speaker in the third epoch-round, her current chain must be of length less than n/5
while Bob’s current chain must be longer than n/5; Bob gets to speak if his chain is of length
less than n/5 while Alice’s chain is longer than n/5. In all other cases, the epoch contains only
two rounds. We emphasize that due to the noiseless feedback, both parties agree on the received
symbols (in both sides), which implies they agree on the current chains in both side, and thus, on
the order of speaking in every epoch. The Next procedure, which determines the next speaker
according to the current received transcript, captures the above idea.
The coding scheme is depicted in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 (Part I): A coding scheme against (1/5, 1/5)-corruptions assuming noiseless feedback
(Large Alphabet; Alice’s side)
Input: A binary alternating protocol π0 with feedback; noise parameter 1/5 − ǫ. Alice’s input for π0
is x.
Let Σ = [n]× {0, 1, ∅}.
1: Throughout the protocol, maintain SA, RA, RB, the sent, received by Alice,
and received by Bob (as indicated by the feedback) symbols communicated
up to the current round, respectively.
2: for i = 1 to n = |π0|/ε do
3: pnext = Next(RA, RB) ⊲ Determine the next party to speak
4: if pnext =Alice then
5: T ←TempTranscript(SA, RA, RB)
6: The next symbol σ = (link, b) to be communicated is:
link is the latest non-corrupted round link < i where Alice is the speaker
(j = 0 if no such round exists).
b = π0(x | T ) if Alice is the sender in π0, otherwise (or if π0 has completed)
b = ∅.
7: else
8: (receive a symbol from Bob)
9: end if
10: end for
11: j ← argmax |Parse(R≤jB )|
12: j′ ← argmax |Parse(R≤j′A )|
13: Output TempTranscript(SA, R
≤j′
A , R
≤j
B )
4.2 Basic properties
Every transmission m ∈ Σ = [n]× {0, 1, ∅} is interpreted as mi = (linki, bi) where linki points to
a previous symbol mj.
Definition 4.1. For any i ∈ [n] define prevA(i) as the maximal round j < i where Alice is the
speaker at round j, or as 0 if no such j exists. Similarly, prevB(i) is the maximal round j < i where
Bob is the speaker at round j, or as 0 if no such j exists. Generally, Prev(i) without a specific
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Algorithm 1 (Part II): the Parse, Next, and TempTranscript Procedures
14: procedure Parse(m1, . . . ,mt)
15: Chain← ∅; j ← t;
16: while j > 0 do
17: Chain← Chain ∪ {j}
18: j ← mj .link
19: return Chain
20: end procedure
21: procedure TempTranscript(SA, RA, RB) ⊲ procedure for Alice; Bob’s al-
gorithm is symmetric22: Set GB = Parse(RA)
23: Set GA as all the rounds in which outgoing trans-
missions are not corrupted (as learnt by RB, SA)
24: For any i < n, if Prev(i), i ∈ GA ∪GB ∪ {0} add i to GoodChain
25: Set T as the concatenation of all {bi}i∈GoodChain , where σi = (linki, bi) is the symbol received
in round i.
26: return T
27: end procedure
28: procedure Next(RA, RB)
29: i← |RA|+ |RB |+ 1 ⊲We are at round i
30: j ← 1; SkipCntA ← 0, SkipCntB ← 0
31: loop
32: if i = j then return Alice ⊲ The speakers in the first two
rounds of each epoch are fixed33: if i = j + 1 then return Bob
⊲ Update the Skip counters
34: if |Parse(R<j+2A )| ≤ n/5 then SkipCntB ← SkipCntB + 1
35: if |Parse(R<j+2B )| ≤ n/5 then SkipCntA ← SkipCntA + 1
36: if |Parse(R<j+2B )| ≤ n/5 < |Parse(R<j+2A )| then ⊲ The epoch contains a 3rd
round whenever one skip
counter increases but the
other does not
37: if i = j + 2 then return Bob
38: else j ← j + 3
39: else if |Parse(R<j+2A )| ≤ n/5 < |Parse(R<j+2B )| then
40: if i = j + 2 then return Alice
41: else j ← j + 3
42: otherwise
43: j ← j + 2 ⊲ An epoch with only 2 rounds
44: end loop
45: end procedure
Note: R≤jA is the prefix of RA as received by the j-th round of the protocol (incl. j) and R
≤j
A
excluding round j. R≤jB and R
<j
B are similarly defined.
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subscript refers to the maximal round j < i where the speaker in round j differs from the speaker
of round i.
It is easy to verify that Algorithm 1 is computationally efficient, as long as π0 itself is efficient.
Lemma 4.1. For any constant ε > 0 and any π0 given as a black-box, Algorithm 1 is computation-
ally efficient in |π0|.
Proof. The algorithm runs n = O(|π0|) iterations, in each of which it needs to determine the next
speaker, determine the partial transcript so far and determine the next message to send. The
former two activities require performing Parse on all the symbols received by both parties; this
takes O(n) time. Setting the next message requires a single activation of π0.
4.2.1 Good rounds and the implied transcript
Next, we show that when a transmission arrives correctly at the other side, the receiver learns all
the uncorrupted transmissions communicated so far. First, let us define the notions of good rounds
and implied transcript.
Definition 4.2 (Good Round). A round i is called good if the transmissions in both rounds i and
Prev(i) are uncorrupted. Let GOOD be all the good rounds and GOOD≤i , GOOD ∩ [i].
We additionally set any round i ≤ 0 to be good (and uncorrupted) by definition.
Definition 4.3 (Implied Transcript). For any round i, the transcript T (i) is defined as the (natural
order) concatenation of bits {bj}j∈GOOD≤i where σj = (linkj , bj) is the symbol transmitted (and
correctly received) in round j.
While the above GOOD and T (i) are tools for the analysis, the next lemma shows that whenever
the i-th transmission arrives correctly at the other side, the receiver learns GOOD≤i and T (i).
Specifically, the variable GoodChain (Line 24) equals GOOD≤i and TempTranscript outputs T (i).
This allows us (despite some abuse of notations) to treat T (i) and the output of TempTranscript
interchangeably, as long as i is uncorrupted.
Lemma 4.2. For any i ∈ [n], if the transmission of round i is uncorrupted, then GoodChain =
GOOD≤i at the receiver, and TempTranscript outputs T (i).
Proof. Assume, without loss of generality, that Alice is the receiver of the i-th transmission. Since
transmission i is uncorrupted, it holds that GB = Parse(RA) contains exactly all the uncorrupted
transmission sent by Bob so far. Alice knows her own uncorrupted transmissions GA via the
feedback. Then GoodChain indeed holds all the good rounds up to rounds i, and TempTranscript
outputs T (i) by definition.
Remark 1. Assume round i is corrupted and let j < i be latest uncorrupted round. Then
T (i) = T (j) which equals the output of TempTranscript in round j. However, the output of
TempTranscript in round i may be arbitrary.
The next lemma argues that, if round i is uncorrupted, then the implied transcript T (i) (and
hence the output of TempTranscript in round i) is indeed a correct (partial) simulation of π0.
Lemma 4.3. Assume that round i is uncorrupted. Then T (i) is a prefix of π0(x, y).
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Proof. The proof goes by induction on i. The base case T (0) = ∅ is trivial. Assume that the claim
holds for T (j) for any uncorrupted round j < i; we show that the same holds for round i.
Assume, without loss of generality, that Alice is the receiver in round i. Let j be the maxi-
mal previous round where Alice’s transmission was not corrupted. Since round j is uncorrupted,
Lemma 4.2 proves that, at round j, Bob learns GOOD≤j and T (j). By the induction hypothesis,
T (j) is a prefix of π0(x, y).
If j < PrevA(i) then i is not a good round, i /∈ GOOD≤i. It holds that GOOD≤i = GOOD≤j
and T (i) = T (j), therefore, T (i) is indeed a prefix of π0(x, y). Otherwise, j = PrevA(i) and i is a
good round. As said, in round j Bob learns T (j) (which is a correct prefix of π0(x, y)). Next, in
round i it is Bob’s turn to send the symbol σi = (linki, bi). If it is Bob’s turn to speak in π0, then
bi = π0(y | T (j)) will indeed be the correct continuation of T (j) according to π0; otherwise Bob
sends bi = ∅. In both cases, the channel does not corrupt σi, Alice learns GOOD≤i and the implied
transcript she constructs equals T (i) = T (j) ◦ bi. Hence, T (i) is indeed a prefix of π0(x, y).
4.2.2 Skipped rounds, the order of speaking and noise-progress tradeoffs
The order of speaking in the protocol depends on the observed noise measured through the length
of the current chain. Whenever the current chain is shorter than n/5 for only one of the parties,
this party “skips” one round of communication—the other party gets to speak in one additional
round. We now define the skipping mechanism and use it to show that the coding scheme makes
progress unless much noise has occurred.
Definition 4.4. We say that the epoch that starts at round i is Alice-skipped if |Parse(R<i+2B )| ≤
n/5. Similarly, it is Bob-skipped if |Parse(R<i+2A )| ≤ n/5.
Note that an epoch can be both Alice- and Bob-skipped. Whenever an epoch is Alice-skipped,
the counter SkipCntA increases by one (Line 35) and Alice speaks only one time in that epoch.
Similarly, in a Bob-skipped epoch, SkipCntB increases by one and Bob speaks only once.
Next we prove some properties on the number of rounds each party gets to speak, as a function
of the noise. In particular, we relate between the variables SkipCntA,SkipCntB to the number of
rounds Alice and Bob get to speak, denoted RCA,RCB respectively.
Lemma 4.4. Alice is the sender in 12(n − SkipCntA + SkipCntB) rounds and Bob is the sender in
1
2(n− SkipCntB + SkipCntA) rounds.
Proof. We split the protocol into the epochs generated by the Next procedure. For the i-th epoch
denote n(i) ∈ {2, 3} the number of rounds in that epoch, and let A(i) (resp., B(i)) be an indicator
which is 1 if the epoch is Alice-skipped (resp., Bob-skipped).
Note that Alice speaks in the i-th epoch exactly 12(n(i)−A(i)+B(i)) times: if n(i) = 2 it must
hold that A(i) = B(i) and Alice speaks once. She also speaks once if n(i) = 3 but Bob speaks
at the third round, A(i) = 1, B(i) = 0, i.e., if this is an Alice-skipped but not Bob-skipped epoch.
Finally, Alice speaks twice only when n(i) = 3 and A(i) = 0, B(i) = 1. Then,
RCA =
∑
i
n(i)−A(i) +B(i)
2
=
n− SkipCntA + SkipCntB
2
.
The case for Bob is symmetric.
19
Remark 2. In fact, due to rounding and the fact that Alice is the first to speak, she might get
one extra round if the total number of rounds doesn’t divide to full epochs, e.g., when the last epoch
contains only a single round. A more accurate statement is RCA ≥ (n−SkipCntA+SkipCntB)/2−2
(and similarly for Bob). In order to ease the proof, we ignore this issue.
Next, we connect the number of skips with the amount of noise that happens during the first
part of the protocol.
Claim 4.5. If t transmissions by Alice were corrupted during the 2n/5 first rounds, then at the
end of the protocol,
SkipCntA ≥ n/5 + t.
Proof. During the first 2n/5 rounds, all the epochs are both Alice- and Bob-skipped (i.e., epochs
of size 2). This means that by round i = 2n/5, SkipCntA = n/5.
Split rounds [2n/5 + 1, n] into epochs as done by the Next procedure; note that there are at
least n/5 epochs in this part of the protocol. Since the noise corrupted t of Alice’s transmissions
before round 2n/5, it can corrupt at most n/5 − εn − t additional transmissions of Alice beyond
round 2n/5.
That is, in at least n/5 − (n/5 − εn − t) = t + εn of the epochs after round 2n/5, Alice’s
transmission (in the first round of the epoch) is not corrupted; call these epochs Alice-uncorrupted.
Note that by round 2n/5, Alice’s “correct” chain is of length at most n/5 − t. As long as the
length of Alice’s correct chain is less than n/5, any Alice-uncorrupted epoch is also Alice-skipped.
In each such epoch, SkipCntA increases by one and Alice gets to speak only once. The length of
Alice’s correct chain also increases by one in each such epoch. It follows that in each of following
t Alice-uncorrupted epochs, SkipCntA increases until the length of the correct chain exceeds n/5
and the condition of line 35 does not hold any longer (for uncorrupted transmissions. Uncorrupted
transmissions may increase SkipCntA even further). Since the number of Alice-uncorrupted epochs
is t+ εn > t, the counter will indeed reach at least n/5 + t.
The following lemma captures a key property of our resilient protocol—a relation between the
length of the simulated transcript and the number of corruptions occurred so far.
Lemma 4.6. If, up to some round r, there were t Alice-skipped epochs where Alice’s transmission
is uncorrupted, and at most t− k corruptions in Bob’s transmissions, then
T (r) ≥ k.
Proof. We prove the claim by induction on k for all r ≥ t ≥ k.
The base case: k = 0, trivially holds since for all r, t, we have |T (r)| ≥ 0. For the inductive
step, we assume that the lemma holds (for both parties) for some k and any r ≥ t ≥ k, and wish
to show that it also holds for k+1 and any r ≥ t ≥ k+1. Specifically, let r, t where r ≥ t be fixed.
We are given that by round r there are t Alice-skipped Alice-uncorrupted epochs, and that Bob’s
transmissions suffer from at most t− (k + 1) corruptions; we need to show that |T (r)| ≥ k + 1.
Since the number of corruptions at Bob’s side by round r is less than t − k, the induction
hypothesis tells us that there exists some round j ≤ r where |T (j)| ≥ k. Let j be the minimal
round such that j ∈ GOOD and |T (j)| = k while |T (j − 1)| = k − 1. Recall that T extends only in
good rounds (Definition 4.3), hence, such a round j must exist.
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Assume there are t′ Alice-skipped Alice-uncorrupted epochs until round j − 1. It follows that
the number of corruptions at Bob’s side (up to round j − 1) is at least t′ − k + 1: if the number of
corruptions is strictly less than t′− k+1 then by induction T (j − 1) ≥ k contradicting the way we
chose j. It follows that the number of corruption in Bob’s transmissions for round [j, r] is at most
(t− k − 1)− (t′ − k + 1) = t− t′ − 2.
We now split into different cases. Assume Alice is the speaker in the j-th round. We know
that j ∈ GOOD and |T (j)| > |T (j − 1)|. This implies that round (j − 1) is uncorrupted and that
Bob is the next to speak in π0 given T (j), due to the alternating nature of π0. Note that Alice
has at least t− t′ additional uncorrupted rounds within Alice-skipped epochs in rounds [j, r] (note
that Alice speaks in round j, which is uncorrupt). In all these cases, either Bob speaks a single
time immediately after Alice, or he speaks twice after Alice (Alice-skipped epoch). Since at most
t−t′−2 of Bob’s transmissions are corrupted, it follows that there must exist an uncorrupted round
j′ ∈ [j +1, r] where Bob is the speaker and PrevA(j′) is uncorrupted, i.e., j′ ∈ GOOD. This implies
that Bob sends the correct symbol that extends T in round j′, thus |T (j′)| = |T (j)| + 1 = k + 1.
Since |T (·)| is non-decreasing, we proved the claim.
The other case is when Bob is the speaker in the j-th round. Again, j ∈ GOOD, since |T (j)| >
|T (j − 1)|, thus, rounds j itself is uncorrupted. Then, in [j + 1, r] Alice has t − t′ additional
uncorrupted rounds (in Alice-skipped epochs) while at most t − t′ − 2 of Bob’s transmissions are
corrupted. Similar to the previous case, after each one of the aforementioned Alice-skipped Alice-
uncorrupted rounds, Bob either speaks once or twice. If we consider the previous (PrevB) of
these t − t′ rounds of Alice, we know that at most t − t′ − 2 of them can be corrupted (notice
that round j itself belongs to Bob and is uncorrupted!). This means that there must exist a
round j′ ∈ [j+1, r] where Alice is the speaker and PrevB(j′) is uncorrupted, i.e., j′ ∈ GOOD. Then,
|T (j′)| = |T (j)| + 1 = k + 1 which completes this case.
An immediate corollary of the above lemma shows that the “correct” chain of the coding scheme
fully simulates π0. Indeed, Claim 4.5 ensures that SkipCntA ≥ n/5 by the end of the protocol.
Furthermore, the corruption on Bob’s side is bounded to (1/5 − ε)n. Lemma 4.6 then gives that
T (n) ≥ εn = |π0|.
Yet, we still need to prove that the protocol outputs, in round n, a chain that contains T (n) as a
prefix. In other words, we need to prove that the correct chain is a prefix of the longest chain. This
is the goal of Section 4.3 below.
Another useful corollary of Lemma 4.6 is the following lemma that measures the progress in the
first 2n/5 alternating rounds, as a function of the total amount of corruptions in that part.
Lemma 4.7. If by round i ≤ 2n/5 there were at most i/2 − k corruptions then |T (i)| ≥ k.
Proof. This is an immediate corollary of Lemma 4.6. Note that all the n/5 epochs up to round 2n/5
are both Alice-skipped and Bob-skipped epochs, and that the order of speaking is alternating.
Assume that Alice has t uncorrupted rounds until round i, then Bob’s transmissions suffer from at
most (i/2 − k)− (i/2 − t) = t− k corruptions. Lemma 4.6 gives that T (i) ≥ k.
4.3 Resilience to (1/5− ε, 1/5− ε)-corruptions
In this part we prove the following theorem.
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Theorem 4.8. For any ε > 0 and any binary alternating protocol π0, Algorithm 1 correctly sim-
ulates π0 over a noisy channel with noiseless feedback and is resilient to any (1/5 − ε, 1/5 − ε)-
corruption.
In the following we assume the noise is a (1/5−ε, 1/5−ε)-corruption, even if we do not explicitly
say. As mentioned earlier, Algorithm 1 simulates the entire transcript of π0 correctly in its good
rounds. However, the parties cannot tell which are the good rounds. Instead, we show that the
transcript implied by the longest chain contains the entire transcript of π0 as its prefix.
Proposition 4.9. Assuming a (1/5 − ε, 1/5 − ε)-corruption, the longest chain at the end of the
protocol implies the correct answer.
Towards proving this proposition let us set some notations and prove some technical lemmas.
Consider a complete instance of the coding scheme of Algorithm 1. Let PA be the longest chain of
Alice’s transmissions as seen by Bob at the end of the protocol. Formally, PA = Parse(R
≤jmax
B )
with jmax = argmaxj |Parse(R≤jB )|.
Lemma 4.10. Let PA be the longest chain of Alice at the end of the protocol. Then,
|PA| ≥ RCA − (1/5 − ε)n.
Proof. In any uncorrupted round, Alice’s transmission contains a link to the longest previous correct
chain (Line 6), thus extending this chain by at least one link. These uncorrupted rounds where
Alice is the speaker form a chain of length at least RCA − (1/5− ε)n. The longest chain at the end
of the protocol, PA, may only be longer.
Given a chain PA we differentiate between several types of Alice’s rounds: (i) uncorrupted
rounds that are on PA (denote these as the set NCA); (ii) corrupted rounds that are on PA (denote
these rounds as the set D); and (iii) corrupted rounds that are not on PA (denote these rounds as
the set J).
Corollary 4.11.
J +D ≤ (1/5 − ε)n (1)
NCA + (1/5 − ε)n− J ≥ RCA − (1/5 − ε)n (2)
Proof. Eq. (1) follows trivially from bounding the noise to a (1/5 − ε, 1/5 − ε)-corruption. Eq. (2)
is an immediate corollary of Lemma 4.10 and Eq. (1), since |PA| = NCA +D.
In a similar way we can define PB as the longest chain of Bob’s transmissions as observed at
the end of the protocol, and NCB as the set of uncorrupted rounds where Bob is the speaker and
the rounds included in PB . We define wA, wB to be the number of corrupted transmissions in the
first 2n/5 rounds (of Alice’s transmissions and Bob’s, respectively). Furthermore we distinguish
between before and after round 2n/5 via a prime and double prime superscripts, respectively, i.e,
NC ′A = NCA ∩ [1, 2n/5], NC ′′A = NCA ∩ [2n/5 + 1, n],
D′ = D ∩ [1, 2n/5], D′′ = D ∩ [2n/5 + 1, n],
J ′ = J ∩ [1, 2n/5], J ′′ = J ∩ [2n/5 + 1, n].
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Lemma 4.12. Assuming the longest chain PA yields an incorrect output, it holds that
NC ′A ≤ wB + εn.
Proof. Assume the above equation doesn’t hold, that is, NC ′A − wB > εn. We prove that this
means that the longest chain contains, as a prefix, a correct and complete simulation of π0.
Indeed, up to round 2n/5 there were at most n/5 − NC ′A corruptions at Alice’s side and wB
corruptions at Bob’s, with a total of n/5 − NC ′A + wB < n/5 − εn. Lemma 4.7 implies that the
progress up to round 2n/5 is at least εn, that is, |T (2n/5)| ≥ εn = |π0|. Since the entire transcript
of π0 is correctly simulated by the NC
′
A uncorrupted rounds, and these rounds are on the chain PA,
it holds that the chain PA implies the correct answer, in contradiction to the lemma’s statement.
We can now prove the main proposition, which also implies Theorem 4.8.
Proof. (Proposition 4.9) Assume towards contradiction that the longest chain PA does not imply
the correct answer. We show that in this case we have NCA + (1/5− ε)n− J < RCA − (1/5− ε)n,
or alternatively (via Lemma 4.4),
J > NCA + 2(1/5 − ε)n − RCA
J > NCA − (1/10 + 2ε)n + SkipCntA/2− SkipCntB/2, (3)
in contradiction to Corollary 4.11.
Claim 4.13.
SkipCntB ≥ NC ′A + (1/5 − ε)n
SkipCntA ≤ 2n/5−NC ′A + J ′′
Proof. Lemma 4.12 suggests that the number of corruptions in Bob’s transmissions in the first 2n/5
rounds is wB ≥ NC ′A − εn. Claim 4.5 then implies that SkipCntB ≥ n/5 +wB ≥ n/5 +NC ′A − εn.
As for SkipCntA, in the first 2n/5 it increases by n/5 trivially. Then, we can assume that every
round in J ′′ increases SkipCntA. For rounds in NC
′′ ∪D′′, they can increase the counter only until
the length of the chain reaches n/5, that is, at most n/5−NC ′A times. A bound on the counter is
given by
SkipCntA ≤ n/5 + J ′′ + (n/5−NC ′A).
With the above bounds on the skip-counters, the right-hand side of Eq. (3) is bounded by
NCA − (1/10 + 2ε)n + SkipCntA/2 − SkipCntB/2
≤ NCA − (1/10 + 2ε)n + n/5−NC ′A/2 + J ′′/2−NC ′A/2− (1/5 − ε)n/2
≤ NC ′′A + J ′′/2− 3εn/2. (4)
Now, if NC ′′A ≤ 3εn/2, then Eq. (3) holds and we reached a contradiction. Otherwise, NC ′′A > 0
which means that D ∩ [2n/5] = ∅, hence, NC ′A + J ′ = n/5. Assume that NC ′′A ≤ n/5−NC ′A (we
will prove this shortly), then Eq. (4) is upper bounded by
≤ (n/5−NC ′A) + J ′′/2− 3ε/2
≤ J ′ + J ′′/2− 3ε/2
≤ J.
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We obtained a contradiction for the second case as well. We are left to show that the assumption
we took earlier holds, i.e.,
Claim 4.14.
NC ′A +NC
′′
A ≤ n/5.
Proof. If the claim does not hold, then there are n/5 Alice-skipped Alice-uncorrupted transmission
on the chain that becomes the output. Since the number of Bob’s corrupted transmissions is limited
to n/5− εn, Lemma 4.6 immediately gives that the length of the correct simulation of π0 is at least
εn = |π0|. This transcript is contained in the output chain and contradicts the assumption that
the longest chain implies an incorrect output.
5 A Coding Scheme with a Constant-Size Alphabet
5.1 From large to constant alphabet: Overview
The coding scheme of Section 4 uses an alphabet of a polynomial size that can describe links to
each of the n rounds of the protocol. We now show how to decrease the size of the alphabet to a
constant. The main, and quite natural, idea is to encode each link using several symbols. Assume
the alphabet Σ where each message is of size log |Σ| ≈ C2 bits; C is some constant that may
depend on ε, i.e., C = Oε(1). We split each message m ∈ Σ into the fields (link, type,msg) where,
link ∈ {0, . . . , C}, type ∈ {std, start, stop, cont} and msg ∈ [C] ∪ {0, 1, ∅}.
In order to link to a message which is at most C transmissions back, the link field can be used
directly to contain a relative pointer. That is, link = 1 means the previous transmission, link = 2
means the second previous transmissions, etc. In this case, type = std and the msg field contains
the payload—the bit b ∈ {0, 1} sent by the party according to π0 (or msg = ∅ if the other party is
to speak in π0).
When the protocol needs to link to a transmission which is x > C transmissions back, we use a
variable-length encoding of the relative pointer. Specifically, the coding begins with a message with
type = start. Next, the value of x is encoded in the msg fields of the next logC x transmissions.
In each such segment (except for the first one), the link field still points to the last uncorrupted
transmission. The type field equals cont to denote this transmission is a (middle) fragment of the
encoding. On the last fragment, type = stop denotes the end of the encoding.
A possible problem occurs when a party wishes to send an encoding of some (large) value
x, however, during the transmission of this encoding many corruptions occur. Due to the noise,
the link field of some specific segment of the encoding of x is too small to point to the previous
segment. For concreteness, say the two segments are y > C transmissions apart. In this case, the
above encoding acts recursively. That is, we initiate a new encoding (for y) by sending a message
with type = start, whilst the encoding of x is still in progress. In the following transmissions, the
msg fields contain the value y. After all the bits of y are transmitted, a message with type = stop
indicates the end of y’s encoding. Then, the encoding of x resumes from the point it stopped.
Once all the fragments of x have communicated, a message with type = stop indicates the end of
x’s encoding, and the protocol continues as before.
This encoding does not harm the rate of the coding: most of the times the pointer is small
enough and fits in a single link field with no further encoding (type = std). A burst of t > C
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consecutive corruptions causes the addition of ⌈logC t⌉ transmissions that describe a pointer to t
transmissions beforehand. It is not too difficult to verify that n/C is a bound on the total added
communication due to these encodings. We can the set C = 1/ε so that the added communication
is bounded by εn transmissions.
These transmissions do not take part in the simulation of π0 and can be considered as a “cor-
ruption” towards that goal (although they serve a critical role in generating the uncorrupted chain).
We argue that the effect of these transmissions on the simulation of π0 is at most as harmful as εn
corrupted transmissions. It then follows that if the noise corrupts at most 1/5 − 2ε transmissions
in each direction, the “effective” noise level (including transmissions used for encoding links) is
bounded by 1/5 − ε, which is low enough to allow the correct simulation of π0.
5.2 A coding scheme with a constant-size alphabet
Towards a scheme with constant-size alphabet let us (re)define some of the basic elements we use.
Let C = 1/ε be constant (without loss of generality, assume C is an integer). We define our
alphabet to be
Σ = {0, . . . , C} × {std, start, stop, cont)× ([C] ∪ {0, 1, ∅}).
Every m ∈ Σ is interpreted as m = (link, type,msg) where link points to a previous symbol m′
unless type = start which indicates that the link to m′ is encoded in the msg field of the next
symbols. The type field indicates whether the encoding has completed (type = stop) or it still goes
on (type = cont). We emphasize that whenever type 6= start the link field indeed points to the
previous uncorrupted transmission. We let link = 0 indicate the first message in the chain (no
previous message).
For any m1, . . . ,mt ∈ Σ, the “chain” of messages, Parse(m1, . . . ,mt), is determined by going
over the chain link-by-link, until we hit the head of the chain (link = 0) or an encoded link
(type 6= std). In this case we collect the fragments of the link (recursively, in case we hit another
instance of encoding before we are done collecting all the fragments of the current encoding), decode
them and continue parsing from the transmission pointed by the encoded value. The fragments
that contain the encoding are omitted from the parsed output (so that the chain contains only the
“real” messages of π0). The Parse procedure is formally described in Algorithm 2.
The coding scheme with a constant-size alphabet is given in Algorithm 3. It is very similar to
the coding scheme of Algorithm 1 except for the handling of encoded links, i.e., the encoding a far
link and parsing a chain that contains encoded links.
Similar to Algorithm 1, the coding scheme of Algorithm 3 is clearly computationally-efficient.
Lemma 5.1. For any constant ε > 0 and any π0 given as a black-box, Algorithm 3 is (computa-
tionally) efficient in |π0|.
The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 4.1, once verifying that the new Parse procedure
still takes linear time in n.
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Algorithm 2 The Parse procedure of for the constant-size alphabet coding shceme
1: procedure Parse(m1, . . . ,mt)
2: j ← t
3: Chain← ∅
4: while j is monotonically decreasing and j > 0 do
5: if mj .type = std then
6: Chain← Chain ∪ {j}
7: j ← j −mj .link
8: else
9: j ← j −EffectiveAddress(m1, · · · ,mj)
10: end if
11: end while
12: return Chain
13: end procedure
14: procedure EffectiveAddress(m1, . . . ,mt)
15: if mt.type 6= stop then return 0 ⊲ Error
16: Temp← mt
17: j ← t−mt.link
18: while j is monotonically decreasing and j > 0 do
19: if mj .type = cont then ⊲ continue collecting fragments
20: Temp← Temp ∪ {mj}
21: j ← j −mj .link
22: else if mj.type = start then ⊲ all fragments are collected; decode msg fields
23: Temp← Temp ∪ {mj}
24: return the value obtained by concatenating the msg fields in all
the messages in Temp in the natural order.
25: else if mj.type = stop then ⊲ recurse on inner encoding
26: j ← j −EffectiveAddress(m1, . . . ,mj)
27: else if mj.type = std then ⊲ shouldn’t happen whilst in encoding
28: return 0
29: end if
30: end while
31: end procedure
26
Algorithm 3 A coding scheme with a constant-size alphabet (Alice’s Side)
Input: A binary alternating protocol π0 defined over noiseless channels with feedback; a noise parameter
1/5− 2ǫ. Alice’s input for π0 is x.
Let C = 1/ε and Σ = {0, . . . , C} × {std, start, stop, cont)× ([C] ∪ {0, 1, ∅}).
Without loss of generality, we assume log2 C is an integer.
The procedures Next and TempTranscript are as described in Alrogithm 1.
1: Throughout the protocol, maintain SA, RA, RB, the sent, received by Alice and received by Bob (as
indicated by the feedback) symbols communicated up to the current round, respectively.
2: msgStack← ∅.
3: for i = 1 to n = |π0|/ε do
4: pnext = Next(RA, RB) ⊲ Determine the next party to speak
5: if pnext =Alice then
6: T ←TempTranscript(SA, RA, RB)
7: Let lastMsg be the offset to the latest uncorrupted round where Alice is the speaker.
8: Let b = π0(x | T ) if Alice is the sender in π0, otherwise (or if π0 has terminated) b = ∅.
9: if lastMsg > C then ⊲ Encode link using multiple segments
10: Write lastMsg as a binary string s = s1s2 · · · st where ∀i, |si| = logC
11: msgStack← push((stop, st), (cont, st−1), . . . , (cont, s2), (start, s1))
12: end if
13: if msgStack = empty then ⊲ Complete sending links before sending new messages
14: link← lastMsg
15: type = std
16: msg ← b
17: else
18: link← lastMsg ⊲ Irrelevant if type = start, otherwise lastMsg ≤ C
19: (type,msg)← msgStack.pop()
20: end if
21: send the symbol σ = (link, type,msg)
22: else ⊲ Bob is the speaker
23: (receive a symbol from Bob)
24: end if
25: end for
26: j ← argmaxParse(R≤jB )
27: j′ ← argmaxParse(R≤j′A )
28: Output TempTranscript(SA, R
≤j′
A , R
≤j
B )
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5.3 Analysis
Lemma 5.2. Let E denote the set of all the rounds where the transmission is uncorrupted and has
type 6= std (i.e., is a part of an encoding). Then
|E| ≤ εn
Proof. Any burst of t > C corruptions causes at most ⌈logC t⌉ uncorrupted transmissions with
type 6= std, that encode a link to t transmissions back. Due to the recursive manner of the
encoding, a later burst of corruptions has no effect on the encoding of previous links, it only delays
the rounds in which the first encoding is transmitted by the amount of rounds needed to encode
the link that comes after the later burst. In other words, a burst of t corruption followed by a burst
of t′ corruptions cause at most ⌈logC t⌉+ ⌈logC t′⌉ rounds with type 6= std. Since the total number
of corrupted rounds (per party) is bounded by (1/5− ε)n, then the total encodings length (for that
party) is bounded by n/C.
Partition E into EA, EB , the encoding rounds at Alice and Bob side, respectively. Assume that
the noise pattern on Alice’s transmission is composed of bursts of lengths t1, t2, . . . , tk where for
every i we have |ti| > C (otherwise ti doesn’t add any transmissions with type 6= std). Note that
the above requirement implies that k < n/5C.
|EA| =
k∑
i=1
⌈logC ti⌉ ≤ k + k logC
(
k∑
i=1
ti
k
)
≤ k + k logC
( n
5k
)
,
where the first inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality. EB is bounded by the same value. The
above function monotonically increases in [0, n/5]. The number of messages with type 6= std is then
upper bounded by the value of the function at k = n/5C,
|E| ≤ |EA|+ |EB |
≤ 2
(
n
5C
+
n
5C
logC
(
n
5 n5C
))
=
4n
5C
< εn.
We now prove that Algorithm 3 simulates π0 correctly as long as the corruption level is below 1/5.
The idea is to reduce Algorithm 3 to Algorithm 1. This is done by considering fragments of
encoding as “corrupted” transmissions of Algorithm 1, while still obtaining the correct link from
these encoded transmissions. Since the number of transmissions used for encodings is at most εn,
they “increase” the effective noise level by this small amount, which is still tolerable by Algorithm 1.
Theorem 5.3. Algorithm 3 is resilient to any (1/5 − 2ε, 1/5 − 2ε)-corruption.
Proof. Algorithm 3 differs from Algorithm 1 in one main aspect—rounds in which type ∈
{start, cont, stop}. Other than those rounds, the two algorithms behave exactly the same: given
a similar transcript m1, . . . ,mt for which type = std, they both generate exactly the same partial
transcript, the same next message, and the same next speaker.
We can interpret any instance of Algorithm 3 as an instance of Algorithm 1 in which transmis-
sions with type 6= std correspond to “erased” transmissions in Algorithm 1: transmissions whose
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“link” part is invalid (hence, the parsed chain is empty). Formally, there exists a transformation
that takes any transcript m = m1, . . . ,mn generated by Algorithm 3 on the input x, y assuming a
(1/5 − 2ε, 1/5 − 2ε)-corruption, and generates a transcript m′ = m′1, . . . ,m′n such that
1. m′ is an instance of Algorithm 1 on the input x, y that suffers from a (1/5 − ε, 1/5 − ε)-
corruption.
2. For any i ∈ [n], the parsed chain in both algorithms is the same, ParseAlg. 3(m1, . . . ,mi) =
ParseAlg. 1(m′1, . . . ,m
′
i)
The transformation is as follows: if mi.type = std and mi.link points to a message mj with
mj.type = std, then m
′
i.msg = mi.msg and m
′
i.link = j. If mj.type = stop then m
′
i.link =
EffectiveAddress(m1, . . . ,mj). Other cases are irrelevant (m
′
i will be attributed to a corrup-
tion).
That is, the transmissions contain (logically,) the same message and same link except for trans-
missions that contain links in m. These correspond to corrupted transmissions in m′. However
in every round i where mi links to the end of an encoded link (mj), we set the link in m
′
i to
EffectiveAddress(m1, . . . ,mj), i.e., to the last non-encoding uncorrupted transmission prior
to mi.
Item 2 holds by induction. Assume that for the claim holds for all rounds up to i. Since
both algorithms generate the same parsed chain, they make identical decisions regarding the order
of speaking and the identity of the next speaker. If the (i + 1)-th transmission in m links to a
transmission more than C steps back, or if mi+1 6= std then m′i+1 is assumed to be corrupted. In
this case it holds that Parse(m1, . . . ,mi+1) = Parse(m
′
1, . . . ,m
′
i+1) = ∅.
Otherwise, the (i + 1)-th transmission links to a transmission mj at most C steps back,
and mi+1.type = std. If mj.type = std, then m
′
i+1.link = j and the claim holds. If
mj.type = stop, then m
′
i+1.link points to the link encoded by EffectiveAddress(m1, . . . ,mi).
Since Parse in Algorithm 3 resolves the identity of the message prior to mi+1 as the one pointed
by EffectiveAddress(m1, . . . ,mi), it outputs the same sequence as Parse(m
′
1, . . . ,m
′
i+1) does
in Algorithm 1.
As a consequence of Item 2, the parsed chains, and hence the implied transcripts are identical
between the two instances for any i ∈ [n]. Therefore, for any round i, the transmission generated
by Algorithm 1 given m′1, . . . ,m
′
i−1 equals m
′
i defined by the above transformation, except for two
cases: when mi is corrupted and when mi is an encoding (mi.type 6= std). Lemma 5.2 bounds the
number of encoded transmissions by εn. Hence, any instance with a (1/5−2ε, 1/5−2ε)-corruption
in Algorithm 3 translates to an instance of Algorithm 1 with a (1/5 − ε, 1/5 − ε)-corruption.
The correctness of the Algorithm 3 follows from the correctness of the Algorithm 1.
6 Applications for Circuits with Short-Circuit Noise
In this section, we prove our main theorems (Theorems 1.1 and 1.2). We show that the KW-
transformation between formulas and protocols (and vice versa) extends to the noisy setting in
a manner that preserves noise-resilience. Applying the results of Sections 4–5 onto the realm of
boolean formulas gives a construction of formulas resilient to an optimal level of a fraction (1/5−ε)
of short-circuit gates in any input-to-output path. Additionally, the results of Section 3 imply that
noise-resilience of 1/5 is maximal for formulas (assuming polynomial overhead).
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In the following subsections, we show how to convert between formulas and protocols without
affecting the noise-resilience. If we start with a formula that is resilient to (α, β)-corruptions, our
transformation yields a protocol resilient to (α, β)-corruptions (Proposition 6.7). Moreover, given
a protocol resilient to (α, β)-corruptions, the transformation yields a formula which is resilient to
a similar level of noise (Proposition 6.11).
6.1 Preliminaries
Formulas A formula F (z) over n-bit inputs z ∈ {0, 1}n is a k-ary tree where each node is a
{∧,∨} gate with fan-in k and fan-out 1. [While our results apply to any k, in this section we will
usually assume k = 2 for simplicity.] Each leaf is a literal (either zi or ¬zi). The value of a node v
given the input z ∈ {0, 1}, denoted v(z) ∈ {0, 1}, is computed in a recursive manner: the value of
a leaf is the value of the literal (given the specific input z); the value of an ∧ gate is the boolean
AND of the values of its k descendants, v0, · · · , vk−1, that is v(z) = v0(z)∧ · · · ∧ vk−1(z). The value
of an OR gate is v(z) = v0(z) ∨ · · · ∨ vk−1(z). The output of the formula on z, F (z), is the value
of the root node. We say that F computes the function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} if for any z ∈ {0, 1}n
it holds that F (z) = f(z).
The depth of a formula, denoted depth(F ), is the longest root-to-leaf path in it. The size of
a formula, denoted |F |, is the number of nodes it contains. We denote by V∧ the set of all the ∧
nodes, and by V∨ the set of all the ∨ nodes.
Karchmer-Wigderson Games For any boolean function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, the Karchmer-
Wigderson game is the following interactive task. Alice is given an input x ∈ f−1(0) and Bob gets
y ∈ f−1(1). Their task is to find an index i ∈ [n] such that xi 6= yi. We are guaranteed that such
an index exists since f(x) = 0 while f(y) = 1. We denote the above task by KWf .
Karchmer and Wigderson [KW90] proved the following relation between formulas and protocols.
Theorem 6.1 ([KW90]). For any function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, the depth of the optimal formula
for f equals the length of the optimal interactive protocol for KWf .
The above theorem is proven by showing a conversion between a formula for f and a protocol
for KWf , which we term the KW-transformation. In this conversion, the formula-tree is converted
into a protocol tree, where every ∧ gate becomes a node where Alice speaks and every ∨ gate
becomes a node where Bob speaks. For a node v, the mapping av : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is set as follows.
For a given input z, consider the evaluation of the formula F on z. The node v is an ∧ gate and we
can write v(z) = v0(z) ∧ v1(z) where v0 and v1 are v’s left and right descendants, respectively. If
v0(z) = 0 we set av(z) = 0; otherwise we set av(z) = 1. For an ∨ gate denote v(z) = v0(z) ∨ v1(z),
and bv(z) = 0 if v0(z) = 1; otherwise bv(z) = 1. If the protocol reaches a leaf which is marked with
the literal zi or ¬zi, it outputs i. For technical reasons we will assume that the protocol outputs
either zi or ¬zi rather than just giving the index i. Note that the literal always evaluates to the
value of f ; In this work a KWf protocol must satisfy this additional requirement.
It is easy to verify that the following invariant holds: for every node v reached by the protocol
on some input (x, y) ∈ f−1(0) × f−1(1), it holds that v(x) = 0 while v(y) = 1. This holds for the
root node by definition, and our selection of mappings av, bv maintains this property. Specifically,
for an ∧ gate v for which v(x) = 0 it must hold that at least one of the gate’s inputs is zero. Indeed,
the way we chose av advances the protocol to a child node that evaluates to 0. Since v(y) = 1 then
both children of v evaluate to 1 on y, thus both descendants satisfy the invariant. The analysis for
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an ∨ gate is symmetric. It follows that once the protocol reaches a leaf (the literal zi or ¬zi), that
literal evaluates differently on x and on y, so xi 6= yi as required. In particular, the literal evaluates
to 0 on x and to 1 on y.
The same reasoning allows us to convert a protocol for KWf into a formula for f : consider the
protocol tree and convert each node where Alice speaks to an ∧ gate and each node where Bob
speaks to an ∨ gate. If the protocol outputs zi or ¬zi at some leaf, that literal is assigned to that
leaf.
Proving that this conversion yields a formula for f is shown by induction on the length of the
protocol. If |KWf | = 0, then the protocol outputs (say) zi without communicating. It is clear
that all inputs in the domain satisfy xi 6= yi, and that xi = 0 while yi = 1 (negate these values
if the output of the protocol is ¬zi). For the induction step, assume without loss of generality
that Alice is to speak first. For some partition X0 ∪ X1 = f−1(0), Alice sends 0 when x ∈ X0
and otherwise she sends 1. By induction, the continuation of the protocol can be converted into
formulas F0 and F1 (corresponding to the case where Alice sends 0 and 1, respectively), for which
F0(x) = 0 when x ∈ X0, F1(x) = 0 when x ∈ X1, and F0(y) = F1(y) = 1 when y ∈ f−1(1).
Taking F = F0 ∧ F1 completes the proof. The other case, where Bob is to speak first is symmetric.
See [KW90] for further details about the KW-transformation from formulas to protocols and vice
versa, and for the formal proofs.
Remark 3. In the above, formulas are assumed to have fan-in 2 and protocols are assumed to
communicate bits. However, the same reasoning and conversion applies also for a more general case,
where each ∧, ∨ gate has fan-in k, and the protocol sends symbols from alphabet of size |Σ| = k.
Furthermore, while our claims below are stated and proved assuming fan-in 2, all our claims
apply to any arbitrary fan-in k.
Short-Circuit Noise A short circuit noise replaces the value of a specific node with the value
of one of its descendants. A noise pattern E ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k − 1, ∗}|V∧|∪|V∨| defines for each node
whether it is short-circuited and to which input. Specifically, if for some node v, Ev = ∗ then the
gate is not corrupted and it behaves as defined above. Otherwise, the value of the node is the value
of its Ev-th descendant, v(z) = vEv(z). We denote by FE the formula with short circuit pattern
E; we sometime write F for the formula with no short-circuit noise, i.e. with the noise pattern
E = ∗|V∧|∪|V∨|.
We say that a circuit is resilient to a noise pattern E if for any z ∈ {0, 1}n it holds that
F (z) = FE(z).
Definition 6.1. We say that F is resilient to δ-fraction of noise if it is resilient to all noise
patterns E in which the fraction of corrupted gates in any input-to-output path in F is at most δ.
We can also be more delicate and distinguish between noise in ∧-gates and ∨-gates.
Definition 6.2. An (α, β)-corruption of short-circuit errors, is a noise pattern on a formula F of
depth n that changes at most αn ∧-gates and at most βn ∨-gates in any input-to-output path in F .
The following is immediate by definition.
Claim 6.2. If, for some δ > 0, the formula F is resilient to any (δ, δ)-corruption of short-circuit
errors, then F is also resilient to δ-fraction of noise.
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On its surface, the other direction does not necessarily hold: (δ, δ)-corruption may corrupt up
to a fraction 2δ of the gates in each path, hence resilience to δ-fraction appears to be insufficient
to resist all (δ, δ)-corruptions. Nevertheless, we argue that these two notions are indeed equivalent.
The reason is that a short-circuit in an ∧-gate can only turn the output from 0 to 1. A short-circuit
in an ∨-gate can only turn the output from 1 to 0. Then, if a formula evaluates to 1 on some input,
the output remains 1 regardless of any amount of short-circuited ∧-gates. If the output is 0, it
remains so regardless of any number of short-circuited ∨-gates. This observation was already made
by Kalai et al. [KLR12].
Lemma 6.3 ([KLR12, Claim 7]). Let F be a formula, z an input and E any error pattern. Let
E∧ be the error pattern induced by E on the ∧ gates alone (no errors in ∨ gates); Let E∨ be the
error pattern induced by E on the ∨ gates alone. It holds that if FE∧(z) = 0, then FE(z) = 0 and
if FE∨(z) = 1 then FE(z) = 1.
The above lemma then implies that resilience to δ-fraction of noise corresponds to resilience to
the same fraction of noise in both type of gates.
Lemma 6.4. If, for some δ > 0, the formula F is resilient to a fraction δ of short-circuit noise,
then F is also resilient to any (δ, δ)-corruption.
Proof. Assume F has depth n and consider any inputs x, y such that F (x) = 0 and F (y) = 1.
Let E be an arbitrary (δ, δ)-corruption pattern. In particular, E short-circuits up to δn of the
∧-gates and additionally up to δn of the ∨-gates in any input-to-output path. Let E∧ be the error
pattern induced by E on the ∧ gates alone and let E∨ be the error pattern induced by E on the ∨
gates alone. Note that both the noise patterns E∨ and E∧ corrupt at most δ-fraction of the gates
in each path.
Since F is resilient to δ-fraction of noise, we have
FE∨(x) = FE∧(x) = 0, (5)
FE∨(y) = FE∧(y) = 1. (6)
Lemma 6.3 and Eq. (5) then imply that FE(x) = 0. Similarly, the lemma and Eq. (6) imply
that FE(y) = 1. Since the above holds for an arbitrary (δ, δ)-corruption E and for all inputs x, y,
we get that F is resilient to (δ, δ)-corruptions.
Following the mapping between formulas and protocols, [KLR12] made the observations that a
short-circuit error in a formula translates to channel noise in the equivalent KW protocol, assuming
both parties learn the noise, i.e., assuming noiseless feedback. We will sometimes abuse notations
and identify a short-circuit noise pattern with a transmission noise pattern for a formula F and
a protocol π that share the same underlying tree structure. Furthermore, we will denote the two
different objects with the same identifier E.
6.2 From Formulas to Protocols
We begin with a KW-transformation for noisy formulas, given a specific noise pattern.
Definition 6.3 (Noisy KW-transformation). For any formula F (z) and any noise pattern E for F ,
the noisy transformation of FE yields an interactive protocol π
FE defined as follows over the domain
F−1E (0) × F−1E (1).
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• The formula-tree is converted into a protocol tree, where every ∧ gate becomes a node where Alice
speaks and every ∨ gate becomes a node where Bob speaks.
• For a node v, the mapping av(z) for z ∈ F−1E (0) and the mapping bv(z) for z ∈ F−1E (1) are set
as follows. Consider the evaluation of the formula FE on z.
– If v is an ∧ gate, write v(z) = v0(z)∧ v1(z) where v0 and v1 are v’s left and right descendants
in F , respectively. For any z ∈ F−1E (0), if v0(z) = 0 we set av(z) = 0; otherwise we set
av(z) = 1.
– For an ∨ gate and z ∈ F−1E (1) denote v(z) = v0(z) ∨ v1(z), and set bv(z) = 0 if v0(z) = 1;
otherwise bv(z) = 1.
• A leaf of F marked with the literal zi or ¬zi becomes a leaf (output) of the protocol with the same
literal.
Remark 4. In the above definition, we assume that if both v0(z) = 0 and v1(z) = 0 (for z ∈
F−1(0)), the protocol continues to the left child. This choice is arbitrary, and any other choice is
valid and gives an alternative protocol which still satisfies Proposition 6.5 and Corollary 6.6 below.
For instance, we can have non-intersecting sets Z0 and Z1 that determine the inputs z for
which we take the left or right child, respectively (assuming both subformulas evaluate to 0 exactly
on Z0 ∪ Z1).
Proposition 6.5. For any formula F (z) and any noise pattern E for F , consider the noisy formula
FE(z) and the protocol π
FE obtained by performing the noisy KW-transformation of Definition 6.3.
Given any instance of πFE on inputs (x, y) ∈ F−1E (0)×F−1E (1) along with the noise induced on
the protocol by E, it holds that any node v in the protocol tree reached by that instance maintains
that v(x) = 0 and v(y) = 1 in FE.
Proof. Denote the noisy instance of the protocol by πFEE . The proof goes by induction on the
depth d of πFEE . For the base case d = 0, no noise/short-circuit is possible, the formula is just a
leaf (either the literal zi or the literal ¬zi) and the protocol outputs that same literal. The claim
trivially holds by the assumption that (x, y) ∈ F−1E (0)× F−1E (1).
For d ≥ 1, consider the case where the top gate in FE is an ∧ gate (the case of an ∨ gate is
shown in a similar manner). Denote the top gate by v and its left and right descendants as v0
and v1, respectively.
There are two cases according to the noise associated with the top gate. If there is no noise at v,
Ev = ∗, then for any input z it holds that v(z) = FE0(z) ∧ FE1(z), where FE0, FE1 are the noisy
subformulas of FE rooted at v0 and v1 respectively.
8 Since FE(y) = v(y) = 1 it must hold that
FE0(y) = FE1(y) = 1. Additionally, FE(x) = v(x) = 0 therefore at least one of FE0(x) and FE1(x)
must be 0. The protocol ΠFEE proceeds to the left child if FE0(x) = 0, or to the right child otherwise.
By the induction hypothesis, the claim holds for the depth d − 1 subprotocol that corresponds to
the (noisy) sub-formula FE0 or FE1 accordingly.
If there is noise at v, without loss of generality, Ev = 0, then v(z) = FE0(z). It follows that
FE(z) = FE0(z), and specifically, FE0(x) = 0 while FE0(y) = 1. Note that in the protocol π
FE
E ,
the noise at node v dictates that the parties continue to node v0 regardless to Alice’s input and
8If v has only one child, the claim holds trivially.
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transmission9. By the induction hypothesis the claim holds for the depth d − 1 subprotocol that
corresponds to the noisy sub-formula FE0 rooted at v0.
Corollary 6.6. Assume that FE(z) computes the function f(z). Then, π
FE
E computes KWf .
Proof. Say that on inputs (x, y) ∈ F−1E (0)×F−1E (1) the protocol terminates at a leaf v marked with
either zi or ¬zi. By the above Proposition 6.5 it holds that v(x) = 0 while v(y) = 1, which implies
that xi 6= yi. Note that the literal evaluates to the output of the function as we additionally require
from KWf protocols.
With the above we can show our main proposition for converting formulas to protocols in a
noise-preserving way.
Proposition 6.7. Let F be a (complete) formula that computes the function f and is resilient
to (α, β)-corruption of short-circuit gates in every input-to-output path. Then, a noisy KW-
transformation yields a protocol π (over channels with feedback) that solves KWf and is resilient
to (α, β)-corruptions.
Proof. We convert F into the protocol π defined for inputs (x, y) ∈ F−1(0)×F−1(1) in the following
manner. The conversion is performed similar to the noisy KW-transformation (Definition 6.3),
however the mappings av, bv are set in a specific way we now describe.
Order the nodes in the protocol tree in a BFS order starting from the root, and determine the
mappings associated with each node in that order (i.e., before setting the mapping of some node,
set the mapping of all its ancestors). Assume we wish to set the mapping of a node v. Let S(v,x,y)
be the set of noise patterns E such that E is a (α, β)-corruptions and such that an instance of π
given the input (x, y) and noise E causes the protocol to reach the node v (note that this process
is well defined due to the BFS order).
If v is an ∧ node, for any x, the mapping av(x) maps to the child w for which the subformula
of F rooted at w evaluates to 0 on x for all noise patterns E ∈ ⋃y′∈F−1(1) S(v,x,y′). If v is an ∨
node, then for any y, the map bv(y) maps to the child w for which the subformula of F rooted at
w evaluates to 1 on y for all noise patterns E ∈ ⋃x′∈F−1(0) S(v,x′,y). Note that the mappings may
be partial functions, specifically, if an ∧ node v is not reachable for the input x with any y’s and
any valid noise, then there is no meaning to define av on the input x. Claim 6.8 below guarantees
that for any reachable node v we can always find a child w that satisfies the above condition.
We now prove that the protocol π is resilient to any noise pattern induced by some (α, β)-
corruption pattern E. Let E be a given (α, β)-corruption, and let πE be the protocol defined above
for F assuming the transmission noise induced by E. We claim that the protocol πE computes
KWFE = KWf , which means that π is resilient to the noise E.
Consider the noisy formula FE and its corresponding interactive protocol π
FE given by the noisy
KW-transformation (Definition 6.3). As mentioned in Remark 4 we can make it so the mapping at
any reachable node in πFE where there is a choice whether to go to the left child or the right child,
takes the same choice that π does.10 Then, all the reachable nodes in πFEE behave exactly the same
9Alice is aware of the noise through the feedback, thus she can follow the progress of protocol as defined above.
This shows that a noiseless feedback setting is critical when transforming formulas that suffer from short-circuit noise.
10pi and piFE share the same underlying protocol tree structure, so for each node in one protocol there exists a
corresponding node in the other protocol, which is owned by the same party. Hence, we can set the mappings av and
bv of one protocol via the corresponding mappings of the other one.
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as in πE: say that on input x ∈ F−1E (0) we reach a node v in πFEE and there is no choice for the next
node (e.g., v0(x) = 0 while v1(x) = 1, so we must continue with v0) then also there is no choice in
π, since v1 does not evaluate to 0 with all errors (specifically, it does not evaluate to 0 on x with the
noise E!); however if there is a choice in πFEE , the protocol continues exactly as π. For any input
(x, y) ∈ F−1E (0) × F−1E (1) the protocols πE and πFEE advance exactly the same: they begin at the
root; if they are at node v where Ev 6= ∗ they both advance to the node dictated by Ev; Otherwise,
they both advance to the same node since their mapping (either av(x) or bv(y)) is exactly the same
at that node. Hence, both protocols reach the same leaf and compute the same function for any
input (x, y) ∈ F−1E (0)×F−1E (1) = F−1(0)×F−1(1) (recall that F is resilient to the noise E). Then,
Corollary 6.6 implies that πE computes KWFE = KWf . Therefore, π is resilient to the noise E.
Note that this claim holds for any (α, β)-corruption E, which completes the proof.
We are left to prove the following technical claim used in the above proof.
Claim 6.8. For any node v reached by the construction in Theorem 6.7, and for any x, y such that
π constructed up to that point reaches v on x, y and some valid noise, the following holds.
Let F0 and F1 be the subformulas (of F ) rooted at the left and right child of v, respec-
tively. There is at least one subformula G ∈ {F0, F1} that satisfies GE(x) = 0 for all noise
patterns E ∈ ⋃y′∈F−1(1) S(v,x,y′) (when v is an ∧ node), or GE(y) = 1 for all noise patterns
E ∈ ⋃x′∈F−1(0) S(v,x′,y) (when v is an ∨ node).
Proof. The proof goes by induction on the nodes v given by the BFS ordering. The base case is
when v is the root. The proof for the root node is a simple special case of the proof given below
for an arbitrary v.
Let v be given and assume that the claim holds for all nodes v′ that come before v in the BFS
ordering. Specifically, it holds for all the ancestors of v. We show that the claim holds for v as well.
Consider the case where v is an ∧ node (the other case is similar). First note that for any noise
E and inputs (x, y) for which (the partially constructed) πE(x, y) reaches v it holds that v(x) = 0
and v(y) = 1 in FE . This is given by the way we constructed π so far: it holds for the root node
since FE(x) = 0, FE(y) = 1, and it is maintained throughout the route to v by π’s definition (given
that the claim inductively holds for all the ancestors of v).
Assume towards contradiction that the claim does not hold for v. That is, there are two noise
patterns E0, E1 ∈
⋃
y′∈F−1(1) S(v,x,y′) such that (F0)E0(x) = 1 and (F1)E1(x) = 1.
Define the noise pattern E∗ (over the nodes of F ) in the following way. For any ancestor of v,
E∗ is defined exactly as the ∨-minimal between E0 and E1, i.e., the one that induces the least noise
on ∨-gates in the root-to-v path. Furthermore, for any ∧ gate u in the root-to-v path, if either E0
or E1 contains no noise at u, set E
∗ to have no noise at that gate. Otherwise, both E0 and E1 have
noise at u and since both reach v, the noise must be the same; in this case E∗ contains the same
noise for u as E0 and E1. For the nodes that belong to the subformula F0, the noise E
∗ is identical
to E0, and for nodes that belong to the subformula F1, E
∗ is identical to E1. In all other nodes
there is no noise in E∗.
Clearly by this construction, E∗ is an (α, β)-corruption, since compared to either E0 or E1,
we only reduced the amount of corruptions in both ∧ and ∨ gates between the root and v (and
kept the same number of corruptions below v). Furthermore, there must exist some y′ such that
πE∗(x, y
′) reaches v: Assume E0 was the ∨-minimal. Since E0 ∈
⋃
y′∈F−1(1) S(v,x,y′) there exists
y′ for which πE0(x, y
′) reaches v. We argue that πE∗(x, y
′) also reaches v. Indeed, in any ∨-gate
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πE∗(x, y
′) behaves exactly like πE0(x, y
′) since the noise in both is identical. For any ∧-gate u it
may be that E0 has noise in u while E1 (and thus, E
∗) does not. However, there exists y′′ such that
πE1(x, y
′′) reaches v. Hence, it also reaches u, and it also advances to the same child as πE0(x, y
′)
does when it reaches u. Since u is an ∧-gate, this decision depend only on x. By the above we
learn that if the protocol reaches u and there is no noise, it advances to the same child determined
by the noise E0 at u. Therefore, πE∗(x, y
′) takes the same child of u as πE0(x, y
′). It follows that
πE∗(x, y
′) reaches v, and E∗ ∈ ⋃y′∈F−1(1) S(v,x,y′).
Additionally, in FE∗ , the node v evaluates to 1 on x, because (F0)E∗(x) = (F0)E0(x) = 1 and
(F1)E∗(x) = (F1)E1(x) = 1. But this contradicts the property, asserted at the beginning of this
proof, that for any noise E (and specifically for E∗), any node v that is reachable by πE∗(x, y
′)
must evaluate to 0 on x. Therefore, at least one of F0(x) and F1(x) evaluates to 0 on all noise
patterns in scope.
The conversion from resilient formulas into resilient protocols of Proposition 6.7 implies an
upper bound on the maximal resilience of formulas, and proves Theorem 1.2.
Theorem 6.9. There exists a function f : {0, 1}n → Z such that no formula F that computes f
with fan-in k and depth less than (n− 1)/k, is resilient to a fraction 1/5 of short-circuit noise.
Proof. For z ∈ {0, 1}n, let par(z) = z1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ zn be the parity function.
Let F be a formula that computes par(z) with AND/OR gates of fan-in k and depth depth(F ) <
(n−1)/k. Assume that F is resilient to a fraction 1/5 of short-circuit noise. Lemma 6.4 shows that
F is also resilient to (1/5, 1/5)-corruptions of short-circuits. Moreover, assume that the formula’s
underlying graph is a complete k-ary tree.11 Then, using Proposition 6.7 we obtain an interactive
protocol π for KWpar of length |π| = depth(F ) < (n − 1)/k that communicates symbol from
alphabet of size |Σ| = k, and resilient to (1/5, 1/5)-corruptions. This contradicts Theorem 3.3.
Note that computing the parity of n bits can be done with a formula of depth O(log n). However,
the above theorem shows that any resilient formula for the parity function will have an exponential
blow-up in depth, and thus exponential blow-up in size.
Corollary 6.10. There is no coding scheme that converts any formula F of size s into a formula F ′
of size o(exp(s)), such that F ′ computes the same function as F and is resilient to 1/5-fraction of
short-circuit gates on every input to output path.
6.3 From Protocols to Formulas
Here we would like to prove that a resilient protocol implies a resilient formula.
Proposition 6.11. Let π be a protocol that solves KWf for some function f and is resilient to
(α, β)-corruption. The KW-transformation on the reachable protocol tree of π yields a formula F
that computes f and is resilient to (α, β)-corruption of short-circuit noise in any of its input-to-
output paths.
The above proposition is in fact a reformulation of a result by result Kalai, Lewko, and
Rao [KLR12], implied by Lemma 6.3 and the following.
11If F has a node that has missing children, we can duplicate one of its children to obtain a complete graph. This
clearly does not change the functionality of F , nor its resilience.
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Lemma 6.12 ([KLR12, Lemma 8]). Let f be a boolean function, and let π be a protocol with root
proot. Let T ⊂ f−1(0) × ([k] ∪ {∗})VA and U ⊂ f−1(1) × ([k] ∪ {∗})VB be two nonempty sets such
that the protocol π solves KWf on every pair of inputs and noise in T ×U , and assume any vertex
that is a descendent of proot can be reached using some input and noise from T × U .
Then there is a formula F that is obtained by replacing every vertex where Alice speaks with
an ∧ gate, every vertex where Bob speaks with an ∨ gate and every leaf with a literal, such that
for every (x,EA) ∈ T , (y,EB) ∈ U it holds that FE∧(x) = 0 and FE∨(y) = 1, where E∧ is EA on
Alice’s vertices and ∗ on Bob’s vertices; E∨ is ∗ on Alice’s vertices and EB on Bob’s vertices.
Using our coding scheme that is resilient to (1/5− ε, 1/5− ε)-corruptions (Algorithm 3) we get
that we can fortify any formula F so it becomes resilient to (1/5− ε)-fraction of short-circuit noise,
with only polynomial growth in size.
Theorem 6.13. For any ε > 0, any formula F of depth n and fan-in 2 that computes a function f
can be efficiently converted into a formulas F ′ that computes f even up to 1/5−ε of the gates in any
of its input-to-output path are short-circuited. F ′ has a constant fan-in Oε(1) and depth O(n/ε).
Proof. The conversion is done in the following manner. Given a formula F (that computes some
function f) we first balance it, i.e., convert it to an equivalent formula F˜ of depth log |F | with no
redundant branches. It is well known that such a formula always exists. Next, we convert F˜ into a
protocol π for KWf via the KW-transformation (Section 6.1); note that the length of π is at most
the depth of F˜ , that is, O(log |F |). Then, we convert π into a protocol π′ that solves the same
function KWf and is resilient to (1/5 − ε, 1/5 − ε)-corruptions, assuming noiseless feedback. This
step is possible due to Theorem 5.3. The resilient π′ is then transformed back into the resilient
formula F ′ that satisfies the theorem assertions, using Proposition 6.11. Recall that the depth of
the obtained formula is exactly the length of the resilient protocol.
To complete the proof we only need to argue that the conversion can be done efficiently. It is
easy to verify that converting F˜ to π is efficient, and also converting π to π′ (Algorithm 3) is efficient
by Lemma 5.1. The only part which is possibly inefficient is the reverse KW-transformation from π′
back to a formula, which requires finding the reachable protocol tree of π′—the vertices v for which
there exists an input (x, y) and a (1/5 − ε, 1/5 − ε)-corruption E such that π′(x, y) reaches v if
the noise is E. This part is can be shown to be efficient in by a technique similar to [KLR12]. In
Appendix A we give a detailed proof.
Theorem 1.1 is an immediate corollary of the above theorem, by noting that
|F ′| ≤ kdepth(F ′) =
(
2O(log(1/ε))
)O((log |F |)/ε)
= polyε(|F |).
Here k ≈ ε−2 is the fan-in of |F ′| given by the alphabet size of the resilient interactive protocol π′
constructed earlier.
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Appendix
A Theorem 6.13: Efficiency
We now argue that the conversion from π′ to F ′ in Theorem 6.13 can be done efficiently in the size
of the formula F . Note that in general, the conversion of Proposition 6.11 may not be efficient, but
it is efficient for protocols obtained by the conversion described in Theorem 6.13. The ideas in this
part resemble the analysis of [KLR12] (yet in a somewhat more intuitive manner), and we sketch
here the details for self completeness.
Theorem 6.13 requires us to find, in an efficient way, the reachable protocol tree of π′ assuming
(1/5 − ε, 1/5 − ε)-corruptions. We show a slightly stronger claim:
For any (efficiently computable12) set of noise patterns Φ, we can obtain the Φ-reachable
protocol tree of π′ in an efficient way.
12Specifically, given a noise pattern E, determining whether or not E ∈ Φ should be done efficiently.
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Given a node v of depth h ≤ |π′| in the protocol tree of π′, we say that v is Φ-reachable if there
exist input (x, y) and noise pattern E ∈ Φ such that π(x, y) reaches v when the noise is E. The
Φ-reachable protocol tree of π′ are all the nodes of depth at most |π′| that are Φ-reachable.
Recall that |π| = log |F | and that |π′| = Oε(|π|); set d = |π′|. In the following, “efficiently”
means time complexity of poly(2d) = poly(|F |). The idea behind the algorithm is as follows. Given
v let (v0, v1, ..., vh = v) be the nodes on the unique path from the root to v. We examine each
one of the possible noise patterns that affect only this path. That is, for each node vi we decide
whether it is corrupted or not; there are at most 2d different such noise patterns. For any fixed
noise pattern, we verify that all the other edges (vi, vi+1) are consistent with the behavior of the
simulation, and reject the noise pattern if they are not. If no inconsistency is found, we show that
a valid run of π′ on some input with that noise pattern leads to v.
First, we recall that we assume that the complete protocol tree of π of depth |π| is reachable
for some input given there is no noise at all; that is we prune all the redundant branches.13
Assumption A.1. For any node v in the protocol tree of π there exists an input (x, y) such that
an instance of π on (x, y) reaches v.
The Φ-reachability test of v is performed by Algorithm Reach(Φ, v) depicted below.
Claim A.2. Given an efficiently-computable set Φ, Algorithm Reach(Φ, v) takes time poly(2d).
Proof. It is easy to see that there are at most 2d valid noise pattens for the path γ that should be
considered. For each, we need to go over all possible leaves in π and perform O(d) checks per leaf;
the number such leaves is upper bounded by 2d. The total time is clearly poly(2d).
Theorem A.3. For any input node v and set Φ, Algorithm Reach(Φ, v) outputs Reachable if
and only if there exists some input (x, y) ∈ F−1(0) × F−1(1) and some noise E ∈ Φ, such that
π′(x, y) reaches v when the noise is described by E.
Proof. It is easy to see that if an inconsistency is found for some noise E at Step (3a) then the
obtained γ cannot describe a valid instance of π′ with the noise E (regardless of the input). If the
inconsistency is found at Step (3b) it means that γ cannot describe a valid instance of π′ with noise
E and any input that leads to the leaf l, thus if Step (3b) fails for all leaves l, there is no input
that leads to v assuming that specific noise pattern E.
It remains to show that if no inconsistency is found in steps (3a)–(3b), then the node v is Φ-
reachable. This follows the same reasoning. Let l be the leaf in π and E an error noise pattern for π′
such that when Algorithm Reach checks l, E it outputs that v is reachable. Since l is reachable in
π (Assumption A.1), let (x, y) ∈ F−1(0) × F−1(1) be an input that leads π to the leaf l; note that
(x, y) is a valid input for π′. It is easy to verify that running π′ on (x, y) with the noise E yields
exactly the path γ. Therefore, v is reachable.
13This assumption means that the formula F we start with is optimal; note that obtaining the optimal formula F
for a given function may not be efficient. Yet, this assumption is not crucial. Alternatively (as performed in [KLR12]),
we can assume each leaf in F is an independent variable—surely a resilient coding for such a formula would also be
a resilient version of F , i.e., when only considering inputs that are consistent with F . This, however, causes the
(reachable) protocol tree of pi to be larger, and respectively increases the size of the output resilient formula, yet
keeping its size polynomial in |F |.
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Algorithm Reach(Φ, v): Φ-reachability check for π′
Input: A set Φ of valid noise patterns; a node v in a complete k-ary tree.
1. Given v let γ = (v0, v1, ..., vh = v) be the path from root to v.
2. Let φv be the set of all the noise patterns (Ev0 , . . . , Evh−1) ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1, ∗}h−1 that
affect the path γ, for which
(i) if Evi 6= ∗, for some 0 ≤ i < h then the Evi-th child of vi is vi+1, and
(ii) E ∈ Φ.
3. For all E ∈ φv repeat:
Check if the path γ and the noise E are consistent with some input (x, y):
(a) Verify that, as long there is no noise, γ is consistent with the behaviour of Algo-
rithm 3, i.e., that the link field in each message links to the previous uncorrupted
message (which is known since the noise is known), that large links are encoded cor-
rectly (meaning, that type is correct, and msg corresponds to the correct pointer),
etc.
(b) Loop over all leaves l in π, and let γl be the path from root to l. Check that γ
is consistent with γl: as long as there is no noise the msg field in messages with
type = std are indeed the one implied by γl—they are consistent with the correct
transcript of π given that its input leads to the leaf l.
(c) If all verifications pass for a certain leaf l, output Reachable.
4. output Non-Reachable.
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